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Watershed for American 
Monetary Policy? 
Charles W.  Calomiris and David C. Wheelock 
The Great Depression witnessed many  substantial changes in  the monetary 
policy environment of the United States. These changes included a relaxation 
of  the gold standard, an opening of a new avenue for monetizing government 
debt, changes in the structure of the Federal Reserve System, and the birth of 
a new policy ideology that doubted the stability of private markets and pre- 
scribed government management of  aggregate demand. Did  these changes 
have lasting effects? 
To  address this question, we  begin with a brief review of  Federal Reserve 
policy before and during the Great Depression, which we compare with mone- 
tary policy since the depression. The legacy of the Great Depression is difficult 
to identify from immediate post-World  War I1 policy outcomes because of the 
massive expansion of federal debt during the war and the Fed's  commitment to 
funding that debt at low cost during and well after the war. The period between 
1934 and 1941 is thus especially important for gauging the effects on monetary 
policy of the cyclical downturn of 1929-33  and the institutional reforms it pro- 
duced between 1932 and 1935. Moreover, 1934-41 was a period of  transition 
for the international monetary regime and, thus, provides important evidence 
on the impact of changed international linkages on domestic monetary policy. 
Accordingly, we explore in some depth the monetary policy of  1934-41. 
We discuss how the tools of Fed policy, but not its goals or tactics, changed 
in the mid-1930s. At the same time, we show how structural reforms weakened 
the Federal Reserve relative to the Treasury and removed a key limit on the 
monetization of government debt. While Fed policy goals and tactics did not 
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change in the mid-1930s, the increased power of the Treasury to determine the 
direction of policy, along with the departure from gold and the new “technol- 
ogy” for monetizing government debt, produced a new (albeit small) infla- 
tionary bias in monetary policy that lasted until the Treasury-Federal  Reserve 
Accord of  195 1. 
The second half of the paper focuses on the postwar era. The Fed regained 
some independence with the accord of  195 1 and became increasingly aware of 
the inflationary potential of  excessive monetary growth. The Fed failed to 
break with its traditional (predepression)  operating methods, however, and the 
procyclical bias in these procedures-along  with pressures to monetize gov- 
ernment debt-explains  how the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy in 
the 1960s. 
Such a policy could not have been sustained under the gold standard as it 
existed before the depression. Under that regime, an  incipient excess supply of 
dollars would have produced gold outflows, signaling the need for monetary 
contraction. Under the new dollar standard of Bretton Woods, the inflationary 
bias in monetary policy remained latent until it had gathered substantial mo- 
mentum. That momentum, in turn, caused the external imbalance that underlay 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s and the abandonment 
of external constraints on domestic monetary policy. The most important leg- 
acy of  the Great Depression for monetary policy was  thus its initiation of 
America’s departure from the gold standard.’ 
Thus the institutional changes occurring between 1932 and 1935 mattered 
in two ways.  First, they had  immediate consequences for monetary policy, 
largely  via the  temporary increase in  the power  of  the Treasury. Second, 
depression-era changes removed preexistent checks on inflationary tendencies 
in monetary policy. These “latent” consequences became important in the 
1  960s. 
Our analysis of  the Fed’s  powers, policy intentions, and effects relies as 
much on qualitative historical evidence-Federal  Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) minutes and the like-as  on statistical evidence of breaks or turning 
points in relevant time series. The two approaches are complementary. For ex- 
ample, statistical evidence is essential for documenting the timing of changes 
in free reserves, money, and inflation in the 1960s and the role of policy in 
producing inflation; but without qualitative evidence of policymakers’ inten- 
tions, it would be difficult to distinguish intended from unintended outcomes 
or to explain the timing of important statistical changes. 
1. Our discussion is somewhat at odds with the counterfactual modeling of the gold standard 
by  Bordo and Eichengreen  (chap.  12 in this volume). As we will argue below, we believe that 
going off the gold standard in  1933 produced  a fundamentally different, and more persistent, 
departure than going off the gold standard during wartime. Thus, while we believe that the United 
States probably would have left gold in  1941 even if  it had remained on gold in 1933, we will 
argue that a hard-money standard would have been restored after the war and would have persisted 
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A qualitative historical approach to identifying important turning points in 
policy is particularly useful for understanding the influence of  latent institu- 
tional changes-those  exerting their influence on policy outcomes only after 
long delays or under particular circumstances.  For example, the long-run infla- 
tionary potential of the decoupling of  the dollar from the gold standard that 
began in  1932 was not immediately visible in any data from the 1930s and 
became relevant later only under a particular combination of circumstances. 
Our historical approach eschews purely theoretical analyses of Fed policy 
shifts based either on welfare economics or on political economy. While such 
considerations surely play  a part in our history, we believe that the role of 
theory for understanding policy changes is limited. In many cases, the out- 
comes of policy are different from the intent of policymakers. While economic 
or political economic influences may  shape the intent of policy, institutional 
constraints and mistaken beliefs of policymakers place a wedge between in- 
tents and outcomes. The origins of  the inflation of  the 1960s, for example, 
should not be traced to shifts in economic or political fundamentals affecting 
the taste for inflation. Nor was inflation an inevitable consequence of the de- 
parture from gold. Rather, it reflected the combination of economic circum- 
stances, traditional (flawed) policy rules, new theories about the role of govern- 
ment in  the economy, and  the absence of  gold  standard discipline, which 
together produced an unintended inflation. 
1.1  Monetary Policy during the Great Depression and Before 
To  gauge how  the Great Depression might have  altered monetary policy 
making, we first review monetary policy during the depression. By almost any 
measure, the monetary policy of  1930-33  was a disaster: the money supply 
and price level both fell by  one-third, ex post real interest rates rose well into 
double digits, and banks failed by the thousands. How could the Fed have let 
this happen? 
Explanations for the Fed's disastrous monetary policy during the Great De- 
pression largely fall into two categories. One attributes policy failures to inno- 
cent mistakes or neglect, while the other contends that the Fed willfully engi- 
neered contractionary monetary policy to foster bureaucratic objectives, or in 
response to interest group pressure. Although some political scientists and pub- 
lic choice economists favor the latter explanation (e.g., Epstein and Ferguson 
1984;  Anderson, Shughart, and Tollison 1988),  most economists and economic 
historians blame the Fed's policy on misguided policy rules, as well as on petty 
jealousies that limited the Fed's ability to respond decisively to rapidly chang- 
ing conditions. 
The most prominent explanation of  Federal Reserve behavior during the 
Great Depression is that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who argue that a 
distinct shift in policy occurred with the death in  1928 of  Benjamin Strong, 
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them, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contend that Strong understood how to 
employ the tools of monetary policy to minimize cyclical fluctuations in output 
and prices and to prevent or limit financial panics. His death created a void of 
both leadership and understanding that left the Fed unresponsive to financial 
crises, bank runs, and their contractionary effects. 
Under Strong’s leadership, the Fed had used the tools at its disposal to con- 
duct an activist monetary policy aimed at both domestic and international ob- 
jectives (Wheelock 1991). Large open market purchases and discount rate re- 
ductions in 1924 and 1927 were apparent attempts both to encourage domestic 
economic growth and to enable Great Britain to attract gold reserves. Open 
market sales and discount rate hikes in  1928 and  1929, on the other hand, 
were intended to discourage stock market speculation, which at least some Fed 
officials viewed as a manifestation of inflation. 
On the surface, the Fed seems to have been less responsive to the depression 
than it had been to earlier, smaller, cyclical downturns. Although the Fed made 
some open market purchases and discount rate adjustments between 1929 and 
1933, relative to the declines in output and prices these operations were small 
in comparison with those of the 1920s. 
Despite the Fed‘s  apparent lack of vigor between 1929 and 1933, however, 
some researchers argue that  policy  changed little, if  at all, with Benjamin 
Strong’s death  (e.g., Wicker  1966; Brunner  and  Meltzer  1968; Wheelock 
1991). Monetary policy between 1929 and  1933 appears largely consistent 
with the policy strategy Strong outlined in the 1920s (Wheelock 1991). That 
strategy used borrowed reserves and market interest rates as short-run control 
variables, or policy “instruments.”2  When member banks borrowed relatively 
little from Federal Reserve Banks or market interest rates were unusually low, 
Fed officials interpreted monetary conditions as “easy.” Conversely, high levels 
of  borrowed reserves or high interest rates signaled that money was  “tight.” 
Once the  depression began, both  borrowed  reserves and interest rates fell 
sharply and generally remained low, giving Fed officials the impression that 
money was “cheap” and plentif~l.~ 
Many economists have noted that rigid use of borrowed reserves or interest 
rates as policy instruments will cause the money supply to rise and fall procy- 
2. The use of open market operations for objectives other than to secure earning assets evolved 
in the early 1920s, but their use to manipulate instruments or operating targets, such as borrowed 
reserves, evolved only gradually as the Fed gained experience. Well into the depression, directions 
to the Fed‘s  trading desk from the FOMC specified the dollar amounts of securities the desk was 
authorized to buy or sell. By 1932, however, discussion at FOMC meetings turned more toward 
the desired level of excess reserves and focused less on the specific dollar volume of securities to 
buy or sell. Later in the 1930s, the committee targeted yields on Treasury securities, as well as 
excess reserves. 
3. Borrowed reserves increased markedly in the fourth quarter of  1931, when the United States 
suffered a large outflow of gold following Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard. Fed officials 
understood that money was tight but did not make significant open market purchases. The Fed 
publicly justified its policy by a lack of gold reserves. Wicker (1966) argues that officials feared 
exacerbating gold outflows by pursuing “inflationist” policies. 27  The Great Depression as a Watershed for American Monetary Policy 
clically because borrowed reserves and interest rates are positively correlated 
with economic activity. Moreover, Wheelock (1991) finds that the banking cri- 
ses of 1929-33 made borrowed reserves an especially poor indicator of mone- 
tary conditions during the depression because the crises made banks reluctant 
to borrow. Although a few system officials questioned the reliability of bor- 
rowed reserves as a policy guide during the depression, the prevailing view 
was that monetary conditions were exceptionally easy and that the economy’s 
failure to expand was not the fault of monetary policy. We cannot say for cer- 
tain whether monetary policy would have been different between 1929 and 
1933 had Benjamin Strong lived, but it does seem to have been consistent with 
Strong’s response to business cycle downturns in 1924 and 1927 and with the 
guidelines for assessing the stance of monetary policy he had ~utlined.~  But no 
matter what one’s view of the importance of Strong’s death, this much is clear: 
if the Great Depression was a watershed for monetary policy, the reason was 
not that it made policy active or responsive to the business cycle, for the Fed 
had long had such a policy. 
1.2  Institutional Changes of the 1930s 
The year 1932 marked the beginning of a series of institutional reforms with 
potentially large consequences for monetary policy (table  1.1). Among the 
most significant were the Glass-Steagall  Act of 1932, which permitted the Fed- 
eral Reserve to use government securities to back its note issues; suspension 
of the international gold standard by executive order on 6 March 1933 (ratified 
by Congress on 9 March); the Thomas amendment to the Agricultural Adjust- 
ment Act of  1933, which, among other things, permitted the Federal Reserve 
to  adjust commercial bank reserve requirements; the Gold Reserve Act of 
1934, which authorized the president to fix the dollar price of gold and estab- 
lished the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund; and the Banking Act of 
1935, which markedly altered the structure of the Federal Reserve System and 
expanded the Fed’s authority to adjust reserve requirements. 
By permitting the backing of  Federal Reserve note issues with U.S. govern- 
ment securities, the Glass-Steagall Act of  1932 removed an important con- 
straint on discretionary monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Act (as amended 
in 1917) had required the Reserve Banks to maintain gold reserves equal to 40 
4.  We make no attempt here to consider all aspects of monetary policy between 1929 and 1933 
or the extent to which it was consistent with Strong’s policies. Meltzer, however, reaches many of 
the same conclusions about the failure of monetary policy during the Great Depression that we 
do, writing that “the main reason for the failure of monetary policy in the depression was the 
reliance on an inappropriate set of beliefs about speculative excesses and real bills. This set of 
beliefs, embodied in the Riefler-Burgess framework, directed attention to short-term market inter- 
est rates and member bank borrowing and encouraged their use as indicators of the magnitude and 
direction of monetary policy” (1994,  15). See Wheelock (1991) for analysis of the consistency 
issue, and the references therein for general histories of Federal Reserve policy during the 1920s 
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Table 1.1  Key Institutional Changes in Monentary Policy during the 
Early 1930s 
1932  Glass-Steagall  Act  (27  February):  temporarily  made  U.S. 
government securities  eligible collateral for Federal Reserve 
note issues, thereby expanding the Fed‘s ability to make open 
market purchases (made permanent in 1933); also temporarily 
relaxed rules on discount-window lending (extended in 1933, 
made permanent in 1935) 
Emergency Banking Act (9 March): ratified suspension of the 
gold standard 
Thomas amendment to Agricultural Adjustment Act (12 May): 
authorized  the  Fed  to  set  reserve  requirements;  gave  the 
president  authority to require open market purchases  by  the 
Fed, and to fix the weights of gold and silver dollars 
Banking Act  of  1933  (16  June):  enhanced  Federal  Reserve 
Board  control  of  discount-window  lending;  made  technical 
adjustments to Federal Reserve System organization 
GoldReserve Act (30 January): authorized transfer of monetary 
gold  stock  to  the  U.S.  Treasury;  amended  the  president’s 
authority to fix dollar prices of gold and silver; established the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund 
Silver Purchase  Act  (19 June):  authorized  the  president  to 
purchase and nationalize monetary silver: authorized  limited 
Fed lending to industrial and commercial firms 
1935  Banking  Act  of  I935  (23  August):  reorganized  Federal 
Reserve’s  Open Market  Committee  and otherwise  enhanced 
the authority of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System relative to the Federal Reserve Banks;  extended Fed 
authority to adjust member bank reserve requirements 
1933 
1934 
percent of  their note issues (and 35 percent of  their deposit liabilities), with 
the remaining 60 percent in the form of either gold or “eligible paper,” con- 
sisting mainly of commercial loans that banks could rediscount or sell outright 
to the Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve Act authorized the Reserve Banks 
to purchase government securities but did not permit their use as collateral 
for Fed liabilities. The Glass-Steagall Act of  1932 expanded the definition of 
“eligible paper” to include U.S. government securities in the Fed‘s portfolio, 
thereby enhancing the Federal Reserve’s ability to initiate transactions that 
monetized government debt.5  Although he lent his name to the enabling legis- 
lation, Carter Glass, who had sponsored the original Federal Reserve Act, ap- 
parently voiced considerable worry about the inflationary potential of permit- 
ting government obligations to  serve as collateral for Federal Reserve notes 
5. Previously, member  commercial  banks could  use government securities  as collateral  for 
discount-window borrowing, and during World War I the Fed offered a preferential discount rate 
on such borrowing, with the effect of substantially monetizing the fiscal deficit. These transactions, 
however, were initiated by commercial banks, rather than by the Federal Reserve. 29  The Great Depression as a Watershed for American Monetary Policy 
(Chandler 1971, 189). We  argue below that Glass was  prescient in his con- 
cerns.6 
Suspension of the gold standard removed another substantial barrier to dis- 
cretionary monetary policy. Although the Gold Reserve Act of January 1934 
restored gold convertibility for international payments to other gold standard 
countries, the gold standard imposed no constraint on money supply growth 
through the remainder of the 1930s. Countries that remained on the gold stan- 
dard at their predepression par levels, such as France, tended to lose gold to 
the United States and other countries until finally devaluing or going off gold 
themselves. The coming war  in Europe also precipitated gold flows to the 
United States. Thus, after 1933 the United States was never forced to restrict 
money growth or raise interest rates to protect its international reserves. 
Before 1933, the Federal Reserve, like many central banks, failed to play 
consistently by the rules of the gold standard. The Fed sterilized gold flows, 
allowing offsetting changes in other components of bank reserves in the face 
of  gold inflows or outflows. Twice, however, the Federal Reserve reacted to 
international gold flows in a manner consistent with restoring “external bal- 
ance.” On those occasions,  between November 1919 and June 1920, and during 
September and October 1931, Fed officials believed that gold outflows threat- 
ened their own reserve position. On each occasion, the Fed increased its dis- 
count rate and maintained it at a high level until the crisis had passed, and each 
time the policy was sharply contractionary. The Fed clearly believed that the 
perceived  long-term  benefits  of  defending  the  gold  standard were  worth 
the short-term contractionary impact of  a defense of  their reserve position 
(Wheelock 1991). 
The Roosevelt administration,  by contrast, was willing to relax the gold stan- 
dard to permit reflation. Roosevelt suspended gold payments by executive or- 
der on 6 March 1933, which the Emergency Banking Act ratified on 9 March. 
On  10 March Roosevelt prohibited private transactions in  gold and foreign 
exchange unless licensed by the secretary of the treasury. On 5 April, Roosevelt 
ordered private individuals and banks to deliver their holdings of gold to Fed- 
eral Reserve Banks for transfer to the U.S. Treasury and prohibited future use 
of gold for domestic transactions and private ownership of gold. 
The Gold Reserve Act of January 1934 authorized the president to fix the 
dollar price of gold for international  payments, which Roosevelt did at $35 per 
ounce (in contrast to the previous parity of  $20.67 per ounce). The United 
States thus returned to the gold standard for the settlement of  international 
payments with other countries also on the gold standard. The restored gold 
standard, however, differed fundamentally from the previous standard in the 
degree to which its operation was removed from private markets and placed 
6. The Glass-Steagall  Act of 1932 was intended as an expedient to ensure that sufficient Federal 
Reserve notes could enter circulation in an emergency. It was set to expire after one year but was 
made permanent in March 1933. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 should not be confused with the 
Banking Act of 1933, which is commonly referred to  as the “Glass-Steagall Act.” 30  Charles W.  Calomiris and David C. Wheelock 
under control of  government authorities. Gold was no longer regarded as an 
absolute exogenous check on  government manipulation  of  the  supply  of 
money. Under the weight of  the Great Depression, the ideology of  the gold 
standard, which viewed gold as fundamental to a country’s economic prosper- 
ity,  had cracked. Although the dollar remained linked to gold, the link was 
weakened and, perhaps more important, government authorities had demon- 
strated a willingness to manipulate the gold standard to limit the extent to 
which it would interfere with discretionary monetary policy. Thereafter, when 
the Fed’s gold reserve requirement threatened to limit money supply growth, 
the reserve requirements were reduced and then eliminated with apparently 
little debate or fanfare.’ The gold standard as it existed after 1933 was thus 
fundamentally different from its  precursor and  foreshadowed the  Bretton 
Woods gold standard that was to replace it after World War II.8 
In  addition to marking a fundamental shift in  the degree to which gold 
served as a constraint on domestic monetary policy, the revaluation of gold in 
1934 left the U.S. Treasury with a capital gain of  some $2.8 billion on its 
gold holdings. Under authority conveyed by the Gold Reserve Act of  1934, the 
Treasury used $2 billion of its windfall to establish the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund: “For the purpose of stabilizing the exchange value of  the dollar, the 
Secretary of  the Treasury . . . is authorized . . . to deal in gold and foreign 
exchange and such other instruments of credit and securities as he may deem 
necessary.  ”9 
Although the operations of  the Exchange Stabilization Fund during the 
1930s had little effect on the quantity or growth of bank reserves, the size and 
open-ended authority of the fund was widely viewed as a threat to the Federal 
Reserve System and its ability to effect monetary policy. For example, Roy 
Young, then governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, argued that the 
Gold Reserve Act “gives the Secretary of the Treasury such powers, of a per- 
manent nature, that he could nullify anything we [the Federal Reserve] could 
do” (quoted in Johnson 1939, 36). The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
had a similar reaction: “The Reserve authorities  have been reduced to shadowy 
nonentities, the Federal Reserve System having become simply an adjunct of 
the United States Treasury and the Federal Government, to do what they are 
told to do” (20 January 1934, 367). 
In addition to the Exchange Stabilization  Fund, authorities granted the presi- 
dent and treasury secretary included the right to “request” the Federal Reserve 
to use open market purchases to increase bank reserves by up to $3 billion and, 
7. E.g., the Fed’s gold reserve requirement was reduced from 40 percent (against its note issues) 
and 35 percent (against deposits) to 25 percent in 1945. Foreshadowing the ultimate collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, the reserve requirement against deposits was eliminated in 1965 and 
that against Federal Reserve notes was eliminated in 1968. 
8. Friedman and Schwartz write that “perhaps the best description of the role of gold in the 
United States since 1934 is that, rather than being the basis of the monetary system, it is a com- 
modity whose price is officially supported in the same way as the price of wheat, for example, has 
been under various agricultural programs” (1963,472). 
9. See Schwartz (1997) for a history of the Exchange Stabilization Fund. 31  The Great Depression as a Watershed for American Monetary Policy 
if the Fed refused, to issue a commensurate amount of fiat currency. This power 
was granted by the Thomas amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933, which, along with the Silver Purchase Act of  1934, also authorized the 
purchase of silver and permitted the president to devalue the silver dollar. Be- 
tween  1933 and  1938, the Treasury purchased  1.8 billion ounces of  silver, 
thereby increasing bank reserves by  $1 billion (some 20 percent of the total 
increase in reserves during the period). Had the president chosen to devalue 
the dollar in terms of  silver, the Treasury would have reaped a $2.2 billion 
windfall on its silver holdings (Johnson 1939, 195-98).  In summarizing the 
various new  authorities given the administration, Johnson concludes, “The 
President could double or  triple bank reserves, had complete discretion over 
the gold value-and  consequently the foreign exchange value-of  the dollar, 
and could establish bimetallism by  proclamation, in other words, he could 
completely refashion the monetary system of the country, and the sole criteria 
required were his own subjective evaluations of the situation” (1939, 202). In 
the event, the president never invoked his authority to “request” Federal Re- 
serve purchases or to devalue the silver dollar-he  did not have to since Trea- 
sury pressure generally kept the Fed in line. 
Organizational  changes to the Federal Reserve System may have contributed 
to the Fed‘s willingness to accept the Treasury’s desired monetary policy. The 
authors of  the Federal Reserve Act agreed that the Federal Reserve System 
should not be a “central bank” on the European model, but a federal system of 
semiautonomous Reserve Banks with  an  overseeing board.  Dissatisfaction 
with  the subsequent performance of  the Federal Reserve, both during the 
1920s and during 1929-33, led to reforms that enhanced the authority of the 
Federal Reserve Board at the expense of the Reserve Banks. Marriner Eccles 
accepted the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board in 1933 with the un- 
derstanding that he would have freedom to redesign the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem. His reforms included limits on the power of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, which he viewed as an instrument of the private interests of  New 
York bankers, and measures to ensure oversight and coordination of the activi- 
ties of the regional Reserve Banks in pursuit of  the national interest (Eccles 
Under Eccles’s plan, which the Banking Act of  1935 substantially brought 
into effect, the Board of  Governors was given substantial control over open 
market operations and Federal Reserve Bank discount rates. The FOMC was 
reconstituted to include all seven members of the Board of Governors and just 
five of the twelve Reserve Bank presidents.’O The legislation thereby increased 
the authority and stature of the Federal Reserve officials located in Washington 
1966, 170-72). 
10. The Banking Act of 1935 also changed the titles of the chief executive officers of the Federal 
Reserve Banks from the more prestigious “governor” to “president,” while discontinuing the Fed- 
eral Reserve Board in favor of the Board of Governors, whose members all held the title “gover- 
nor.” The Board of  Governors was further authorized to approve the  appointments of Federal 
Reserve Bank presidents and first vice presidents, and to generally supervise Reserve Bank opera- 
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and appointed by  the president. On the other hand, it also sought to limit the 
influence of the president by removing the secretary of the treasury and comp- 
troller of the currency as ex officio FOMC members. With his reforms, Eccles 
intended that monetary policy would be made by  professionals whose alle- 
giance was solely to the national interest. As we will discuss below, however, 
these changes increased political pressures on the Fed at the same time that 
establishment of  the Exchange Stabilization Fund and  other measures in- 
creased the administration’s  power to conduct monetary policy. consequently, 
these reforms shifted power away from the Fed toward the Treasury and pro- 
moted an inflationary bias in monetary policy. 
1.3  Monetary Policy after the Contraction 
The Federal Reserve lay nearly dormant between April 1933 and February 
1936, when the structural changes to the Federal Reserve System imposed by 
the Banking Act of 1935  took effect. Between April and December 1933, how- 
ever, the Fed did buy nearly $600 million of  government securities, which, 
along with currency inflows, increased member bank reserves by  some $700 
million. The Fed made no further changes to the size of its open market portfo- 
lio until 1937. The Fed also permitted discount-window loans outstanding to 
fall from some $100 million at the end of 1933 to less than $10 million at the 
end of  1934, where they remained for the rest of the decade. 
Over time, Fed officials became increasingly concerned about substantial 
increases in bank reserves, especially excess reserves. During 1934 and 1935, 
gold inflows of some $3 billion contributed to a doubling of member bank total 
reserves (from $2.76 billion in January  1934 to $5.72 billion in December 
1935) and more than a tripling of excess reserves (from $866 million to $2.98 
billion; Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System 1943, 371). The 
buildup of excess reserves alarmed Fed officials, who feared that these “idle” 
balances might permit a wave of speculation and inflation. 
Using its traditional tools the Fed would have reduced reserves (or slowed 
their rate of growth) by selling securities and raising the discount rate. But this 
was not feasible in the mid-1930s. A discount rate increase would have had no 
effect on reserves since discount-window borrowing already was trivial, even 
at a discount rate of just 1.5 percent. Similarly, by  mid-1935, member bank 
excess reserves alone equaled the Fed‘s total security holdings, leaving the Fed 
unable to slow significantly the growth of total reserves through open market 
sales. 
The Fed was given an important new policy tool, however, by  the Thomas 
amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of  1933, which permitted the 
Fed to alter member bank reserve requirements with the approval of the presi- 
dent. The Banking Act of  1935 broadened the Fed’s  authority by  permitting 
the Board of Governors to alter reserve requirements within certain limits inde- 
pendently “in order to prevent injurious credit expansion or contraction.” With 33  The Great Depression as a Watershed for American Monetary Policy 
its traditional means of monetary control becoming ineffective, the Fed came 
to rely on reserve requirements for regulating the supply of money and credit. 
The system’s first major policy initiative after 1933 was to increase reserve 
requirements in three steps in 1936 and 1937. 
1.3.1 
Alarmed at the sharp increase in excess reserves that had taken place since 
1933, and viewing it as potentially inflationary, the Board of  Governors in- 
creased required reserve ratios in August 1936, and again in March and May 
1937. In total, the reserve requirements on time deposits were increased from 
3 percent to 6 percent. Requirements on demand deposits were increased from 
7, 10, and 13 percent to 14, 20, and 26 percent for country, reserve city, and 
central reserve city banks, respectively. The increases, according to the Annual 
Report of the Board of  Governors for 1936, were intended to eliminate those 
excess reserves the board deemed ‘‘superfluous for prospective needs of com- 
merce, industry, and agriculture, and, if  permitted to become the basis of  a 
multiple expansion of bank credit, might have resulted in an injurious credit 
expansion” (14). 
We find certain aspects of monetary policy between 1936 and 1938 striking, 
both in how the practice of monetary policy had changed and in how it had not 
changed since 1933. Gold inflows had made the old tools of monetary policy- 
the discount rate and open market operations-ineffective,  and so the Fed used 
its new tool-reserve  requirements. In raising reserve requirements, however, 
the Fed sought to restore the effectiveness of the discount rate and open market 
operations: “With excess reserves reduced to a manageable figure, the Reserve 
System would be in a position to take prompt action to bring about current 
adjustments of  the reserve position of member banks to credit needs by  em- 
ploying the more flexible instrument of  open-market operations to ease or 
tighten conditions in the money market” (Board of Governors, Annual Report 
1937, 5).  In other words, by  reducing the amount of  excess reserves (and 
thereby increasing the Fed’s  security holdings relative to excess reserves), the 
Fed sought to make usable its traditional tools-open  market operations and 
the discount rate-in  the future if contractionary moves became desirable. 
A second objective of  the reserve requirement increases of  1936 and 1937 
was to limit the banking system’s ability to increase loans and deposits with- 
out Fed acquiescence. The Fed interpreted the excess reserves of commercial 
banks as largely superfluous balances with  inflationary potential. The Fed 
wrote in its annual report for 1936 that ‘(in  raising reserve requirements it was 
not the intention of the Board to reverse the policy of monetary ease which has 
been pursued by the System since the beginning of the Depression” (Board of 
Governors 1936, 15). By reducing excess reserves, the Fed sought to move 
from a policy stance that it viewed as dangerously easy to one that was suffi- 
ciently easy  to  promote continued, but  noninflationary, economic  growth. 
From this perspective, the reserve requirement hikes of the mid-1930s are best 
The Reserve Requirement Increases of  1936 and 1937 34  Charles W.  Calomiris and David C. Wheelock 
seen as an attempt by the Fed to prevent banks from being the engine of infla- 
tion and to return to a status quo in which its traditional rules of thumb and 
traditional policy tools could be used as before. 
The Fed‘s policy was similar to previous policies in two respects. First, Fed 
officials judged the stance of monetary policy with the same indicator-free 
reserves (excess less borrowed reserves)-that  they had used to gauge mone- 
tary conditions during the early 1930s and before. Second, in seeking to pre- 
vent inflation (which they defined broadly to include “speculation”), poli- 
cymakers were influenced by a view that excessively easy monetary policy in 
the 1920s had fueled financial speculation and produced the stock market crash 
and depression.  Extreme proponents of this view held that the Fed should with- 
draw credit during recessions so as to discourage renewed speculation or infla- 
tion and hasten a process of liquidation that they deemed a prerequisite of 
recovery. Although a majority of Fed policymakers, both during 1929-33  and 
later, decided to encourage economic recovery by  promoting monetary ease, 
the “liquidationist”  view undoubtedly influenced the ultimate outcome of Fed 
deliberations both early in the depression and after 1935. 
1.3.2  The Free Reserves Policy Guide 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Fed used free reserves as its main guide 
to monetary conditions. Free reserves is the difference between excess and 
borrowed reserves, but because banks held little or no excess reserves before 
the depression, officials spoke of  monetary conditions in terms of  borrowed 
reserves. For example, in 1926, Benjamin Strong suggested that 
as a guide to the timing and extent of  any [open market] purchases which 
might appear desirable, one of our best guides would be the amount of bor- 
rowing by member banks in principal centers. . . .  Our experience  has shown 
that when New York City banks are borrowing in the neighborhood of  100 
million dollars or more, there is then some real pressure for reducing loans, 
and money rates tend to be markedly higher than the discount rate. . . .  When 
member banks are owing us about 50 million dollars or less the situation 
appears to be comfortable, with no marked pressure for liquidation. (Quoted 
in Chandler 1958,239-40) 
The Fed’s lack of vigor in responding to the depression between 1929 and 
1933 was largely consistent with the policy guidelines Strong outlined. Mem- 
ber bank borrowed reserves plummeted during 1930 and 1931, and again after 
gold outflows and the banking panic in the fourth quarter of 193  1 had subsided. 
In  addition, for the first time, banks accumulated significant excess reserves. 
Some system officials argued that monetary conditions had been made too 
easy-that  the Fed was pushing reserves on a saturated market and thereby 
delaying needed and inevitable economic adjustments. 
Free reserves continued to serve as the Fed’s principal indicator of monetary 
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no reserves after 1933, monetary conditions were measured in terms of excess 
reserves. At  an FOMC meeting in September 1937, E. A. Goldenweiser, the 
Fed’s  chief economist, recalled Strong’s rule of  thumb that monetary condi- 
tions were neutral when New York City banks were borrowing $50 million of 
reserves from the Fed. Now, Goldenweiser claimed, a neutral policy stance 
was achieved when New York City banks held $250 million of excess reserves 
and all banks held $700-$800  million of excess reserves (FOMC, Minutes 11 
September 1937).” Goldenweiser’s  redefinition of monetary neutrality to be a 
free reserve position of  New York  banks some $300 million higher than in 
the past undoubtedly reflected the experience of intervening years, including, 
perhaps, an understanding that banks held excess reserves as a long-run portfo- 
lio choice (compensating  for a decline in bank capital). Free reserves, however, 
remained the metric for judging monetary conditions.  Total reserves, the mone- 
tary base, the money supply, and real interest rates were scarcely considered. 
1.3.3  The “Liquidationist”  Policy View 
The Fed‘s use of free reserves as its principal policy guide during 1936 and 
1937 was consistent with previous policy. We  also find precedent in the claim 
of many policymakers during 1936 and 1937 that excess reserves were super- 
fluous, even dangerous. Between 1930 and  1933, some Fed officials argued 
that  monetary  conditions  were  excessively  easy-that  money  was  even 
“sloppy.” Chandler (1971) describes two schools of thought prevailing among 
system officials in the early 1930s. One school, which Chandler terms the “ac- 
commodationists,” believed that during a recession the Fed should accommo- 
date recovery by  promoting monetary ease, defined as low interest rates and 
little discount-window borrowing. The  other  school, termed  the  “liquida- 
tionists,” believed that monetary ease interfered with recovery by delaying in- 
evitable adjustments of prices, wages, and resource utilization that are neces- 
sary before a sustainable recovery can begin. Between 1930 and  1933, Fed 
officials rarely debated whether monetary conditions could be described as 
“easy” but frequently considered whether monetary ease was the appropriate 
policy to follow. 
Proponents of the liquidationist view tended to blame the depression on fi- 
nancial speculation that, they argued, the Fed had supported with easy money 
policies during recessions in 1924 and 1927. As Adolph Miller, a member of 
the Federal Reserve Board, put it, open market purchases had been made in 
1927 during “a time of business recession. Business could not use and was not 
asking for increased money at that time” (Miller 193  1, 134). It was commonly 
believed, both within and outside the Fed, that the volume of Federal Reserve 
11. The Minutes ofthe Federal Open Market Committee are not verbatim transcripts, but rather 
summaries of the discussion, sometimes with attribution and sometimes not. For exposition, when 
we quote directly from the Minutes, we put such text in quotation marks and attribute  the text to the 
individual referred to in the Minutes. It may be, however, that the quote is not the exact statement of 
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credit outstanding would be appropriate if  extended only at the initiative of 
commercial banks in the rediscount of short-term commercial paper (the “real 
bills doctrine”). Accordingly, Fed credit  should contract during recessions, 
when the demand for commercial loans fell and thus when banks required 
fewer reserves. This explains why officials of  the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond responded as follows to a question from the Senate Banking Com- 
mittee in 1931 about the system’s open market purchases in 1924 and 1927: 
“We think United States securities should not have been purchased in these 
periods, and the aim should have been to decrease rather than augment the 
total supply of Federal Reserve credit” (U.S. Senate 1931, 817). Like Miller, 
these officials believed that open market purchases supplied reserves that were 
unneeded to support productive loans and, hence, fueled the speculation that 
ultimately and inevitably led to a crash and depression.‘2 
Opponents of  open market purchases during the depression often warned 
that not only would monetary ease prolong the downturn but it might reignite 
speculation. For example, Frederic Curtis, chairman of  the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, opposed open market purchases “on the ground that they were 
likely to feed the stock market rather than the bond market” (quoted in Fried- 
man and Schwartz 1963,373). And James McDougal, governor of the Federal 
Reserve Bank  of  Chicago, warned  that if  open  market purchases did  not 
reignite stock market speculation, they might fuel speculation “in some other 
direction” (371). Still another view was put forward by  the governor of  the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia at a meeting of the FOMC in Septem- 
ber 1930: 
We believe that the correction must come about through reduced production, 
reduced inventories, the gradual reduction of consumer credit, the liquida- 
tion of security loans, and the accumulation of savings through the exercise 
of thrift. These are slow and simple remedies, but just as there is no “royal 
road to knowledge,” we believe there is no short cut or panacea for the recti- 
fication of  existing conditions. . . . We  have been putting out credit in  a 
period of  depression, when it is not wanted and could not be used, and 
will have to withdraw credit when it is wanted and can be used. (Quoted in 
Chandler 1971, 137) 
The views of Miller, McDougal, and other liquidationists did not dominate the 
Fed during the 1930s, but they were heard and probably kept the system from 
responding more vigorously to the depression. 
Many of the most vocal critics of easy money policies in the 1920s, such as 
Miller, were no longer in the system in 1936 and 1937, when reserve require- 
ments were being debated. Still, the view remained among policymakers that 
12. Although  today  many of  the liquidationist arguments may  seem strange, under the gold 
standard the price level tended to be stationary, and thus, there is logic in the view that an inflation 
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the depression had been in large part caused by  financial speculation and the 
stock market crash. Many officials believed that the Fed was too slow to check 
speculation in 1928 and 1929, and the consequences of  not reacting quickly 
and decisively to nip speculation in the bud was  one lesson these individ- 
uals took from the depression. This view might explain why in January 1937 
Goldenweiser  advocated further increases in reserve requirements,  despite not- 
ing that unemployment remained high. He argued that it was better to check 
“unsound and speculative situations” in their early stages while control is still 
possible, with now being that time (FOMC, Minutes 26 January 1937). The 
board gave a similar explanation for the timing of  the reserve requirement in- 
creases in its annual report for 1937: “Notwithstanding the fact that recovery 
was far from complete and that there was  still a large amount of  unemploy- 
ment, boom conditions were developing in particular industries and boom psy- 
chology began to be manifested” (Board of Governors 1937,2). 
To summarize, we find that the Fed‘s methods of  interpreting the stance of 
its policy, as well as the fears policymakers had about potential future financial 
speculation and inflation, changed little between the two halves of the 1930s. 
In each period, Fed officials sought to achieve a degree of monetary ease that 
would promote economic recovery but not reignite the sort of  inflation or spec- 
ulation that they thought might hasten another collapse. In 1926, Strong advo- 
cated a borrowed reserves total of $50 million as an appropriate free reserves 
target during a recession. His replacement at the New York Fed, George Har- 
rison, advocated a target for excess reserves of  $250 million at a meeting of 
the FOMC in July 1932 (cited in Chandler 1971,200).  And, finally, at a FOMC 
meeting in March 1937, Marriner Eccles argued that $500 million of excess 
reserves would  make  “ample funds available for legitimate business use” 
(FOMC, Minutes 15 March  1937). The target level was  thus changed from 
time to time, but never the fundamental  policy framework. We conclude there- 
fore that the first major policy initiative following the revamping of the gold 
standard regime and the restructuring of  the Federal Reserve System between 
1933 and 1935 reflected remarkably little change in the Fed’s goals or tactics. 
1.3.4 
The doubling of reserve requirements between 1936 and 1937 suggests the 
absence of an inflation bias in monetary policy and even raises the question of 
whether the Great Depression created a deJutionury  bias-an  excessive con- 
cern with containing speculation that inspired contractionary policy in 1936 
and 1937. We think that such a view is not warranted by  the intent or conse- 
quences of Fed actions in those years. The Fed was willing to double reserve 
requirements when the unemployment rate was well over 10 percent and the 
price level and real output stood far below their 1929 levels, but the Fed did 
not see itself as initiating a contraction of credit. Rather it sought to prevent a 
future expansion of credit that threatened to bring inflation and also derail eco- 
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nomic recovery. Even after reducing excess reserves by  some $2 billion, the 
Fed believed that monetary conditions would remain easy, with ample reserves 
available to support continued economic growth.  l3 
A recession did follow the reserve requirement increases, however, and the 
Fed received considerable criticism from both contemporaries and more recent 
analyses of monetary policy. For our purposes, the Fed‘s intent and its percep- 
tions of policy are more important than the impact of the reserve requirement 
increases, although elsewhere we argue that the reserve requirement increases 
of 1936 and 1937 did not precipitate the recession of 1937 and 1938 (Calomiris 
and Wheelock 1996; see also Frost 1971; Cume 1980; Calomiris and Wilson 
1996). 
1.3.5 
We have argued that Federal Reserve policy in 1936 and 1937 did not reflect 
a major change in system goals or targets. Nevertheless, New Deal reforms 
enhancing the administration’s ability to influence monetary policy affected 
Federal  Reserve behavior in  the  1930s and,  in  concert  with  fundamental 
changes in the gold standard, undermined stationarity of the price level over 
the long term. The Banking Act of  1935 removed the secretary of the treasury 
from the Federal Reserve Board but gave the newly formed Board of Gover- 
nors majority control of  the FOMC. Previously, the 12 Reserve Bank presi- 
dents had formed the FOMC and the board‘s role had been limited to an ambig- 
uous supervisory role. The Banking Act of  1935 put control over open market 
policy in the hands of officials appointed by the president. Furthermore, only 
those members of the Federal Reserve Board who had been Roosevelt ap- 
pointees were placed on the new Board of Governors. 
The new FOMC structure was a compromise between Eccles’s original plan, 
under which open market policy would have been vested solely in the Board 
of Governors, and that of Carter Glass, who argued that open market opera- 
tions should remain the province of  the Reserve Banks. Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau favored the ultimate outcome, intending thus to weaken Eccles 
and the Fed. Referring to the Fed’s  structure before 1935, Morgenthau con- 
cluded in a diary entry that “the way the Federal Reserve Board is set up now 
they can suggest but have very little power to enforce their will. . . . [The Trea- 
sury’s] power has been the Stabilization Fund plus the many other funds that I 
have at my disposal and this power has kept the open market committee in 
line and afraid of  me.”  Favoring the new makeup of  the FOMC committee, 
Morgenthau wrote in his diary, “I prophesy that . . . with the seven members 
of the Federal Reserve Board and the five governors of the Federal Reserve 
Treasury Pressure and an Easing of Policy in 1937 and 1938 
13.  Friedman and Schwartz reach a similar conclusion: “Even so drastic a use of that new power 
[over reserve requirements] does not contradict the view that the Federal Reserve System was 
following a largely passive policy. The rise in reserve requirements was not imposed primarily to 
affect current conditions but to enable the System to control future developments it feared might 
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Banks forming an open market committee, that one group will be fighting the 
other and that consequently they will not be able to do anything constructive, 
and that therefore if  the financial situation should go sour the chances are 
that the public will blame them rather than the Treasury” (quoted in Blum 
1959, 352). 
Regardless of how the Federal Reserve System was organized, the Treasury 
had the power to intimidate the Federal Reserve into carrying out the adminis- 
tration’s  policies. By  1936, Morgenthau believed strongly in sterilizing gold 
inflows to have a weapon to offset outflows should they occur. When Eccles 
and Morgenthau clashed over whether sterilizing operations should be done at 
the initiative of the Treasury or the Federal Reserve, Eccles was forced to back 
down when it became clear that the Treasury had the means and the political 
capital to conduct policy as it saw fit (see Blum 1959, 360-67).14 
The Banking Act of  1935 eliminated a provision imposed by  the Thomas 
Amendment of 1933 requiring presidential approval of changes in commercial 
bank reserve requirements. Still, prior to increasing reserve requirements in 
1936 and 1937, the Fed consulted President Roosevelt and Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau about possible reserve requirement changes.15 The administration 
was not pleased, however, with the apparent impact of those increases on the 
market for government securities and pressured the Federal Reserve into un- 
dertaking offsetting open market operations and ultimately reversing a portion 
of the reserve requirement increase. The Treasury’s new monetary clout set the 
stage for a decade of explicit Treasury dominance of monetary policy and an 
even longer period in which its objective of “maintaining stability” of govern- 
ment securities prices remained an important goal of monetary policy. 
Following the Fed’s  doubling of reserve requirements, Secretary Morgen- 
thau increasingly sought to influence the conduct of  monetary policy. At  a 
meeting of  the FOMC Executive Committee on  13 March 1937, Chairman 
Eccles reported that Morgenthau had expressed displeasure about a decline in 
government bond prices following the 1 March increase in reserve require- 
ments and wanted to know how the Fed intended to rectify the situation. Eccles 
also reported Morgenthau as saying that the Treasury stood ready to use the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund, or possibly end its sterilization of gold inflows, 
to raise bond prices (FOMC, Minutes 13 March 1937). Although members of 
14. Ordinarily, the Treasury paid for its gold purchases by  transferring funds from its Federal 
Reserve accounts to those of member commercial banks, the effect being to increase aggregate 
commercial bank reserves. The Treasury could prevent an  inflow from affecting reserves, i.e., 
“sterilize” it, by  simultaneously transferring funds from its accounts with commercial banks to 
those it held with the Federal Reserve. Alternatively, the Treasury could reduce reserves by issuing 
new debt to the public. 
15. Whether Roosevelt and Morgenthau had approved reserve requirement changes is unclear. 
Some accounts state that they had, while Blum writes that Morgenthau “was taken by surprise on 
July 15  when he picked up the morning paper and read that the Board of  Governors had increased 
requirements 50 percent” and subsequently had a “blistering” conversation with Eccles about it 
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the FOMC agreed that “the drop in prices in the bond market was in the nature 
of  a natural adjustment which was due primarily to non-monetary causes” 
(FOMC, Minutes 13 March 1937, 2), the FOMC Executive Committee met 
with Morgenthau and assured him of their desire to maintain an “orderly” mar- 
ket for government securities while not pegging prices at specific levels. 
On 15 March, the full FOMC met to review the economic outlook and dis- 
cuss Morgenthau’s criticism of Fed policy. The committee agreed to authorize 
open  market purchases  to  preempt  more  invasive action by  the Treasury, 
though Eccles felt that excess reserves remained “ample for legitimate business 
use”  (FOMC, Minutes  15 March  1937, 7).16 Midway through the meeting, 
Morgenthau telephoned Eccles to find out what the FOMC had decided to do, 
and Eccles reported that the committee had voted to maintain an orderly mar- 
ket for government securities and make additional open market purchases in 
the event of an “emergency.” 
Over the subsequent week, and under continuing pressure from Morgen- 
thau, Eccles changed his mind. He now regarded previous policy as having 
been inappropriate and argued that reserve requirement increases had been 
responsible for declines in government bond prices. Although absent from a 
meeting of the FOMC Executive Committee on 23 March, Eccles communi- 
cated his desire to buy government securities because their yields were “quite 
out of line” with reasonable levels. Other members of the Executive Commit- 
tee disagreed, however, deciding that the situation was not an “emergency” 
and therefore did not meet the criterion established at the 15 March FOMC 
meeting for increasing the  system’s  portfolio. A majority of  the Executive 
Committee also argued that open market purchases simply were not needed. 
At the FOMC meeting of 3 April, Eccles relayed Morgenthau’s continued 
displeasure with weakness in the government bond market. He indicated that 
Morgenthau had requested the cancellation of the third increase in reserve re- 
quirements, set for 1 May,  and had threatened to desterilize $500 million of 
gold, thereby increasing coinmercial bank reserves by that amount. Morgen- 
thau also indicated, however, that the Treasury would not act if the Fed bought 
securities in the open market. 
Eccles proposed that the Fed make the open market purchases Morgenthau 
wanted, claiming that the increases in required reserve ratios had “drastically” 
reduced excess reserves and that “it would take the banks some time to accus- 
16. Suggesting the tone of Morgenthau’s meetings with Eccles, Morgenthau claims to have told 
the President suggested that I should say to the Federal Reserve: “Now Congress gave you the 
job of managing the money market and that is your responsibility. You muffed it. You haven’t 
done it. You have not maintained an  orderly market, and this thing is getting steadily worse. . . . 
Now I, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., talking for the U.S. Government, serve notice on the Federal 
Reserve Board that I ask you to do what Congress has given you the power to do, namely, to 
increase your portfolio. If  you don’t do it, the Treasury will step in. . .  . We are putting you on 
notice.” (Quoted in Blum 1959, 373-74) 
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tom themselves to operating with a smaller amount of excess reserves, as evi- 
denced by  the fact that they had sold earning assets rather than reduce their 
balances with correspondents” (FOMC, Minutes 3 April 1937,7). Eccles went 
on to argue that open market purchases were justified because the government 
securities market had been “disturbed” by  the increases in reserve require- 
ments. 
As the FOMC continued to discuss open market policy and the advisability 
of proceeding with the third increase of required reserve ratios, their meeting 
was twice interrupted by calls from Secretary Morgenthau inquiring about the 
committee’s decisions. Following the second call from Morgenthau, a meeting 
of  the FOMC Executive Committee and Morgenthau was arranged for that 
evening. 
The FOMC reconvened on Sunday 4 April, at which time Eccles reported 
that Treasury Secretary Morgenthau had requested that the Fed support bond 
prices and stated that the Treasury would take action if the Fed‘s moves failed 
to  stabilize the  market  for government  securities. Eccles proposed to  the 
FOMC that open market purchases be used to increase the excess reserves of 
member banks by as much as $250 million but argued that the board should 
go forward with plans to increase required reserve ratios on 1 May. Majorities 
of the FOMC and Board of Governors agreed with these proposals. For Eccles 
and Morgenthau, the prime motivation for this policy was not a fear of eco- 
nomic contraction, but rather a perceived need to support the price of  gov- 
ernment securities at a time when the Treasury had a continuing need to float 
debt. Monetary policy had thus become an instrument of Treasury debt man- 
agement. 
By its 11 September meeting, the FOMC recognized that the economy was 
slowing, which policymakers attributed to an unusually large seasonal down- 
turn rather than to a recession. Goldenweiser forecast that the excess reserves 
of New York City banks would soon decline to zero and suggested that a target 
of $250 million of excess reserves might be appropriate to maintain a neutral 
monetary policy. After reviewing  their options, the committee agreed that 
Eccles would propose a policy to Morgenthau in which the Treasury would 
desterilize gold and the Fed would purchase securities. At a continuation of 
the FOMC meeting on 12 September, Eccles reported Morgenthau’s enthusi- 
asm for the plan, whereupon it was agreed that the Fed would purchase up to 
$300 million of  securities in conjunction with a desterilization operation of 
$300 million by the Treasury. 
The Fed‘s close cooperation with (or capitulation to) the Treasury continued 
over the autumn and into early 1938. At a meeting of the FOMC on 21 April 
1938, Eccles indicated that the Board of Governors had agreed to lower reserve 
requirements as part of an administration plan for economic stimulus (which 
also involved desterilization of gold). Goldenweiser explained that the result 
of the joint action would be to restore excess reserves to a level above where 
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1936, but at that time the economy had been “booming,” while now there was 
a “depression” with no end in sight (FOMC, Minutes 21 April 1938, 10). 
As the details of monetary policy discussions during the mid-to-late 1930s 
make clear, the Fed faced considerable pressure from the Treasury. Removal 
of  the treasury secretary from the Federal Reserve Board did not eliminate 
administration influence on monetary policy, while the restructuring of  the 
FOMC probably increased such influence. Perhaps the clearest indication of 
how this affected policy is revealed by the views of George Harrison, president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who headed the FOMC before 1935 
and became its vice chairman in 1935. Between 1930 and 1933, Harrison fre- 
quently favored more expansionary open market  operations than  were  ac- 
cepted by the full committee. During 1936 and 1937, he often disagreed with 
Eccles and other FOMC members who favored a more conciliatory response 
to the treasury secretary’s call for using open market operations to stabilize the 
government securities market. Then, during  1938 and  1939, Harrison again 
disagreed when a majority of the FOMC so feared the appearance of tightening 
that they opposed letting the Fed‘s portfolio decline as securities matured. We 
believe that Harrison’s shift from being an FOMC “dove” to being a committee 
“hawk” reflected not a change in his views, but rather changes in committee 
membership caused in large part by  the restructuring of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
Administration pressure on the Fed also helps explain a shift in the focus of 
monetary policy away from the markets for private securities, such as commer- 
cial paper and bankers acceptances, toward the market for government securi- 
ties. The depression brought a decline of  private economic activity and in- 
creased government spending that made the market for government securities 
larger, both in absolute terms and relative to private markets. More important, 
the Glass-Steagall Act of  1932 and the absence of  a gold standard constraint 
left monetary policy free to monetize government debt, while diminished Fed- 
eral Reserve independence made monetization more likely to occur. In effect, 
deficit monetization was the outcome of  the Fed’s  new policy of  stabilizing 
government securities prices during the late 1930s. The maintenance of  high 
bond prices then became the only policy objective during World War 11. 
1.4  Federal Reserve Monetary Policy and the Accord 
With American entry into World War 11,  the Federal Reserve announced that 
it would peg the yield on Treasury bills at 3/8 percent and maintain ceiling 
yields on government securities of longer maturities of up to 2.5 percent on 
bonds. The Fed stood ready to buy securities without limit to maintain this 
pattern of rates, and by June 1946 the system held 85 percent of all outstanding 
Treasury bills (Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1948, 1400). 
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ceiling yields on other government securities. Between 1947 and 1949, the Fed 
was able to maintain this policy without excessive growth of bank reserves or 
the money supply, but by  1950 inflationary pressures caused the Fed to ques- 
tion the wisdom of  holding government security yields artificially low. The 
Treasury, however, remained firmly committed to funding government debt is- 
sues at low cost, a commitment that only hardened with growing tensions in 
Korea. 
Increased government spending, full employment, and the necessity of fur- 
nishing bank reserves at an increasingly rapid rate to maintain ceiling yields 
on government securities prompted concern at FOMC meetings in 1950. On 
several occasions, the Fed communicated to Treasury officials its view that the 
Treasury should seek “nonbank” sources for funding their debt issues. In reply, 
the secretary of the treasury always made clear his view that the Fed‘s support 
of government securities prices was crucial to the financing of federal govern- 
ment spending. Fed officials became increasingly frustrated with Treasury in- 
transigence, and some argued that it was time for the Fed to act independently. 
For example, at a FOMC meeting on 18 August 1950, Marriner Eccles, who 
had been replaced as chairman of the Board of Governors in 1948 by Thomas 
McCabe, argued that he “felt it was time the System, if it expected to survive 
as an agency with any independence whatsoever, should exercise some inde- 
pendence” (FOMC, Minutes 18 August 1950, 12). 
On 21 August, the FOMC took Eccles’s advice and decided to allow a rise 
in short-term interest rates along with a one-quarter percentage point increase 
in the discount rate to 1.75 percent. This infuriated the Treasury as the Fed‘s 
action came during a major debt-refunding operation. Treasury Secretary John 
Snyder described the resulting decline in demand for government debt as “a 
significant financial failure for the Federal Government” (Snyder 1969, 305 1). 
In subsequent FOMC meetings, Fed officials debated whether to continue to 
buck Treasury policy, with McCabe telling the committee on 11 October that 
they faced “one of the most important decisions [the FOMC] had been called 
upon to make” (FOMC, Minutes 11 October 1950,5-6). The Fed continued to 
argue with Treasury officials that rapid growth of  bank reserves and money 
would cause inflation and do more harm to the market for government securi- 
ties (via the Fisher effect) than modest increases in market yields attendant on 
the withdrawal of Fed price support. These arguments fell on deaf ears. 
As the treasury secretary’s account of the struggle makes clear, the Treasury 
and the Fed disagreed about the potential problems of  continuing securities 
price support and the likely consequences of removing Fed support. The Trea- 
sury interpreted the Fed’s statements of concern about inflation as a desire to 
pursue contractionary monetary policy and, in effect, raise real interest rates. 
The Fed’s main concern, however, was less the current money supply than the 
money  supply process. The Fed felt that  automatic conversion of  Treasury 
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of monetization and inflation, which ultimately would lead to higher nominal 
interest rates.” 
The impasse finally came to a head early in 195 1. Following a meeting with 
the FOMC on 3  1 January, President Truman issued a statement that the FOMC 
had agreed to cooperate fully with the Treasury to maintain the current level 
of interest rates. In fact, the FOMC had made no such commitment.  According 
to the internal Fed account of  the meeting, except for asking for the Fed‘s 
assurance that it shared his goal of maintaining confidence in the government’s 
credit, Truman seemed unconcerned about minor fluctuations in bond prices 
(FOMC, Minutes 3 1 January 1951).18  The White House press release, however, 
stated that the Fed had agreed to hold government security prices at their cur- 
rent levels as long as international tensions remained high. 
Fed officials were much distressed by  the White House account of  their 
meeting with the president and again communicated to Treasury officials that 
the best way to protect the creditworthiness  of the government was to prevent 
inflation. Fed protests led to the formation of a joint Fed-Treasury committee 
to work out their differences on policy matters. In early March 1951, the Trea- 
sury and the Fed reached an agreement, the “accord,” which explicitly recog- 
nized the Fed‘s  independence and allowed some freeing of  government se- 
curity yields to find their market levels. The Fed‘s  vague commitment to 
“support” the government securities market suggests that the Fed gave up little 
to win its independence. 
Underlying the Fed’s new independence was the growth in its balance sheet 
and a consequent reduction in  the potential importance of  Treasury threats. 
Open market purchases during World War I1 and in the postwar period had 
given the Fed considerable scope to alter the level of bank reserves, with Fed- 
eral Reserve credit outstanding rising from some 16 percent of total member 
bank reserves in January 1941 to well in excess of total reserves by war’s end. 
Thus, the accord may have merely reflected the Fed‘s power to forge a more 
independent policy whether or not the administration approved. 
The agreement, however, was not entirely one sided. Coincident with the 
accord, the Truman administration  informed Thomas McCabe, chairman of the 
Fed’s Board of Governors, that he was no longer “effective,” in effect calling 
for his resignation. McCabe’s replacement was William McChesney Martin, 
who had been the Treasury’s chief negotiator on the accord. Moreover, as we 
will show, throughout the  1950s and 1960s the Fed accepted the Treasury’s 
call for low and stable yields on government securities as one objective of its 
discretionary monetary policy. 
17. This discussion draws on Krooss (1969, 3026-71).  For a theoretical discussion of the Fed’s 
concerns, see Eichengreen and Garber (1991). 
18. According to this account of the meeting, Truman had explained how, as a young veteran of 
World War I, he had been forced to cash in his Liberty Bonds at 80 cents on the dollar to buy 
necessities, and “he did not want the people who hold our bonds now to have done to them what 
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In the postaccord period, however, FOMC discussion and policy statements 
came to place increased emphasis on the growth of reserves and money, which 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963,628) refer to as a “near-revolutionary” change 
in system policy (see also Ahearn 1963). Perhaps this development came in 
recognition of how rapid increases in bank reserves and the money supply can 
cause inflation, or with the Fed‘s desire to make clear its intention to forge an 
independent policy. But, immediately after the accord, the Fed also sought to 
restore the workability of the policy strategies that had guided system opera- 
tions in the 1920s. As we will show, during the 1950s the focus of monetary 
policy targeting moved increasingly away from the behavior of total reserves 
and the money supply and toward the cost and availability of  credit. Thus, 
despite new appreciation of the relationship  between growth rates of the money 
supply and  price level, monetary policy during the  1950s and  1960s was 
largely consistent in terms of goals and strategies with the Fed’s long-standing 
behavior. That policy, pursued in a post-1933 environment of weakened politi- 
cal independence, a large outstanding government debt, a relaxed gold con- 
straint, and the new Keynesian ideology, accounts for the inflationary burst that 
began in the mid-1960s. 
1.5  Did the Great Depression Cause the Great Infiation? 
We now explore the fundamental causes of the accelerating inflation of the 
1960s and 1970s. We place special emphasis on two aspects of the monetary 
regime: (1) the Fed‘s  operating strategy, which tended to exacerbate, rather 
than counteract, movements of the price level, and (2) the absence of effective 
long-run constraints on monetary policy, which allowed errors in operating 
strategy to persist. 
The Fed‘s operating strategy, which used free reserves and nominal short- 
term interest rates as policy instruments, was not significantly altered by the 
Great Depression. But the tolerance for long-run policy errors as a result of 
relying on that operating strategy had increased. Most important, the interna- 
tional monetary regime changed substantially  both during the 1930s and after 
World War 11. 
The gold standard provided a source of discipline  on monetary policy, which 
helped ensure long-run stability of the price level. Monetary policy that was 
inconsistent with the long-run maintenance of price stability would cause an 
outflow of  gold. If  gold outflows were not halted by  contractionary policy, 
ultimately the monetary authority would have to abandon gold convertibility. 
Under the Bretton Woods dollar standard, inflationary monetary policy that 
was not consistent with a long-run fixed exchange rate could (and did) continue 
for decades before finally producing the inevitable collapse. 
Expanded power to monetize government debt also contributed toward in- 
flation in the long run. The Glass-Steagall  Act of 1932  relaxed a key constraint 
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liabilities with government securities. Although a gold reserve requirement re- 
mained, the new  authority in effect promoted monetization of  government 
debt. This encouraged increases in government deficits and their monetization, 
as government officials pressured the Fed to maintain low yields on govern- 
ment securities. 
Even after the accord, the Fed continued to place a great deal of emphasis 
on  maintaining “stability” in  the  market  for government securities, which 
translated in practice into monetizing the deficits of the 1950s and 1960s. We 
argue that the history of deficits and Fed reactions to them during the 1950s 
and 1960s is at least consistent with the view that money supply growth, and 
perhaps the deficits themselves, would have been lower if the Fed had lacked 
the power to monetize government debt. 
Two other byproducts of the Great Depression also helped to remove long- 
run constraints on inflationary monetary policy. The diminution of the Federal 
Reserve’s political independence and a concomitant increase in the power of 
the Treasury contributed to the policy of deficit monetization by giving greater 
influence to Treasury objectives in Fed policy making. Another outcome of the 
depression was a new macroeconomic ideology that called for the active use 
of  fiscal and  monetary policy  to  achieve full  employment and  maximum 
growth of real output. 
Our argument that the institutional and ideological legacy of the Great De- 
pression mattered for the history  of  postwar inflation presumes an implicit 
counterfactual argument-that  similar changes would not have come about in 
the absence of the depression. Counterfactual institutional history is treacher- 
ous ground, and reasonable people can differ about what the world would have 
looked like by the 1960s if the depression had not occurred. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the depression produced unique changes that would not have taken 
place otherwise. 
While one could plausibly argue that the gold standard would have been 
suspended during World War 11 (as in previous wars) even in the absence of the 
depression, that is largely beside the point of our argument. Wars had always 
produced temporary departures from fixed exchange rates, but the end of wars 
have brought a return to fixed exchange regimes (Calomiris 1991; Bordo and 
Kydland 1995). The international departure from gold in 1931 and 1933 was 
unique because it was associated with a growing belief that the gold standard 
was a pernicious institution that had contributed to the severity of the depres- 
sion. The depression produced not only a departure from gold but a departure 
from the classical ideology of gold. The ideology of gold-including  the view 
that long-run price stability warranted the sacrifice of control over short-run 
macroeconomic fluctuations-had  withstood over a century of peacetime re- 
cessions and wartime inflations but now  crumbled under the unprecedented 
economic collapse of the 1930s. In its place, the new Keynesian ideology of 
government intervention to manage business cycles would now reign. Thus, 
the depression can be credited with producing a permanent departure from a 
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Similarly, it is likely that permanent monetization of deficits would not have 
been produced by  World War I1 alone. No doubt special temporary laws or 
other measures would have produced wartime monetization during World War 
11, as in World War I. But the expansion in the Fed‘s power to monetize deficits 
in 1932 was important because it did not originate in war and thus would not 
disappear with the end of war. It reflected a new view that monetary powers 
should be broadened permanently-a  view that reflected the perceived need 
to strengthen the Fed’s hand against deflation. 
Finally, it seems unlikely that the diminution of  Fed power that was pro- 
duced by  the 1935 restructuring of the Fed would have occurred without the 
Great Depression. Major restructurings of institutions are typically byproducts 
of a crisis mentality-the  perception that something is drastically wrong. Ab- 
sent the depression, we doubt it would have been so easy for the Treasuly and 
the president to obtain their new powers over monetary policy. 
In the remainder of this section we first document the return to the Fed‘s 
traditional operating strategy after the accord. Then we show how the absence 
of  long-run constraints on policy allowed the Fed to stumble into the unin- 
tended inflationary surge of the 1960s. 
1.5.1  A Return to Traditional Instruments: Interest Rate and Free 
Reserves Targeting 
Following the accord, the Fed placed new emphasis on the growth of bank 
reserves and money supply as sources of inflation, in both public statements 
and internal discussion. In formulating an operating strategy in the postaccord 
era, however, the Fed returned once again to a strategy of using open market 
operations to affect the level of  discount-window borrowing and excess re- 
serves. In the Board of Governors’ annual report for 1953, the Fed stated that 
“during the preceding two years, the Federal Reserve has moved toward greater 
reliance on influencing the cost, availability, and supply of credit through the 
discount mechanism, that is by making it necessary for member banks to bor- 
row from the Federal Reserve Banks a portion of the additional reserves re- 
quired to meet credit growth. This mechanism limits credit expansion, puts 
pressure on banks, and makes them more responsive to changes in the discount 
rate” (quoted in Ahearn 1963, 122). And, the April 1953 Federal Reserve Bul- 
letin indicated that “open market operations and the discount rate are again 
being used . . .  as twin reserve banking measures. . . . Open market operations 
can be employed when needed to condition the current tone in credit markets 
and the general availability of credit. By these operations the Federal Reserve 
can tighten or ease the pressure on member bank reserve positions and thus 
cause banks to borrow or enable them to reduce borrowings at the Reserve 
Banks. Subsequently, this tightness or ease is transmitted and magnified in 
money and credit markets” (quoted in Ahearn 1963, 123). 
These statements are virtually identical to operating guidelines explained by 
Benjamin Strong and other Fed officials in the 1920s. For example, in testi- 
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begin to sell our government securities. It lays the foundation for an advance 
in our discount rate. . .  . The purchase of  securities eases the money market 
and permits the reduction of our discount rate” (Strong 1926, 332-33).  More- 
over, “the influence of the reserve banks upon the volume of credit is . . . felt 
not directly, but indirectly through the member banks. The reserve banks do 
not ‘push’ credit into use” (468). 
Winfield Riefler, who was to be the FOMC secretary during the 1950s, ex- 
plained how the Fed could affect monetary conditions by influencing the vol- 
ume of discount-window borrowing: “Various monetary factors-such  as gold 
movements, changes in currency demand, and open-market operations by the 
Reserve Banks . . .  determine the volume of indebtedness [of member banks to 
the Reserve Banks]. . . .  And changes in this indebtedness appear to be the 
initiating force in corresponding changes in  money rates” (1930, 27). Ac- 
cording to this view, banks are reluctant to borrow from the Reserve Banks, 
and when forced to borrow, banks will sell securities, call loans, and otherwise 
reduce credit. Strong argued that “experience in the past has indicated that 
member banks when indebted to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York . . . 
constantly endeavor to  free themselves from the indebtedness, as a conse- 
quence such pressure as arises is in the direction of curtailing loans” (quoted 
in Chandler 1958, 239). The similarity of  these views with those outlined by 
Fed officials in the 1950s illustrates that at an operational level, monetary pol- 
icy was little changed between the 1920s and 1950s. As in the 1930s, Federal 
Reserve officials in the 1950s sought to make operational the tools and strate- 
gies the Fed had used in the 1920s. Their goal was to reestablish a regime in 
which free reserves served as the operating target, with market interest rates 
and the availability of credit being the intermediate objectives of policy. 
At FOMC meetings in early 1952, one topic of discussion was how to define 
monetary policy “neutrality.” The definition of a neutral policy put forward at 
the meeting of 21 April was a policy “under which System operations endeavor 
to maintain a situation where there is a moderate amount of borrowing at the 
Federal Reserve Bank  [sic]” (FOMC, Minutes 21 April  1952, 15-16).  New 
York Fed President Allen Sproul went on to argue that “a borrowing level of 
$400 million and a high level of excess reserves was not the same as an equal 
amount of  borrowing with no excess reserves” (16). In other words, the key 
variable to focus on was not discount-window borrowing, but rather the differ- 
ence between excess reserves and borrowed reserves, that is, free reserves. As 
Fed Chairman Martin put it, free reserves “had to be used as an indication, for 
that was the framework within which the [FOMC] Account Manager had to 
work” (FOMC, Minutes 6 May  1958, 52). 
By early 1953, the Fed had become sufficiently concerned about inflation to 
increase the discount rate for the first time since 1950 and to carry out open 
market transactions to reduce free reserves. Despite the accord, Fed officials 
remained sensitive to the administration’s desire to keep the rates on govern- 
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erally, the Fed sought to avoid substantial fluctuations in T-bill yields as issue 
dates approached, a policy officials referred to as maintaining an “even keel.” 
At the 6 January 1953 FOMC Executive Committee meeting, policymakers 
decided to tighten, however, even though a Treasury issue was forthcoming. 
Chairman Martin argued for this policy because he saw “danger signs of spec- 
ulation . . . not least of which was activity in the stock market itself” (FOMC, 
Minutes 6 January 1953,5-6).  How reminiscent this was of policy during 1928 
and 1929, and again during 1936 and 1937, when the Fed also manipulated 
free reserves to quell perceived speculation. 
The behavior of free reserves throughout the 1950s and 1960s is consistent 
with its use by the Fed in response to large movements in prices and real out- 
put.  For  illustration, we  plot  in  figure  1.1 the  growth  rate  of  the  consu- 
mer price index (CPI) and the level of free reserves (both smoothed using a 
13-month centered  moving  average filter) from  the  accord  (March  1951) 
through 1969. The Fed acted to increase free reserves in 1954 when industrial 
production declined and the price level held  constant. Free reserves were 
brought down as the economy recovered and inflation rose. Free reserves were 
increased in 1958 with another cyclical downturn, lowered in 1958 and 1959, 
and increased during the recession of  1960. 
During the 1960s, free reserves generally fell, with two notable exceptions 
(see fig.  1.1). Those exceptions were the rises between 1966 and  1967 and 
between  1969 and  1970. The latter reflected the Fed’s  response to a distinct 
slowing of economic activity. The 1966 increase reflected the Fed’s  response 
to a “credit crunch,” which, according to some Fed critics (including President 50  Charles W.  Calomiris and David C. Wheelock 
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Fig. 1.2  Free reserves and money supply growth 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Johnson), had occurred because of an excessively tight monetary policy. More 
important, however, than these fluctuations were the declining trend of net free 
reserves and the rising trend of interest rates. These trends created the impres- 
sion within the Fed that monetary policy was neutral or contractionary-that 
the Fed was “leaning against the wind”--when  in fact policy was quite infla- 
tionary. 
Academic critics of  the Fed, especially monetarists, argued that monetary 
policy was inflationary because the money supply growth rate generally accel- 
erated over the decade. Figure 1.2 shows that the growth rate of demand depos- 
its and currency held by the public (Ml), accelerated during the 1960s even as 
the level of free reserves de~1ined.I~ 
By  1965, inflation had risen to 4 percent, and Fed officials considered anew 
the stance of policy. At the FOMC meeting of  12 October, Chairman Martin 
expressed considerable worry about inflation but argued against a tighter pol- 
icy: “With a divided [open market] committee and in the face of strong Admin- 
istration opposition he did not believe it would be appropriate for him to lend 
his support to those who favored a change in policy now” (FOMC, Minutes 12 
October 1965,69). 
By  the November FOMC meeting, Martin was even more convinced that 
“the country was in a period of  creeping inflation . . . and the balance of pay- 
ments situation would be benefited by  more restraint in the overall economy. 
In  short, he  thought  the  economy  was  growing too  fast  at  the  moment” 
19. Meigs (1962) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964) were among the earliest critics of the free 
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(FOMC, Minutes 23 November 1965, 85). On 5 December, the Federal Re- 
serve discount rate was increased from 4 percent to 4.5 percent. 
Had the Fed finally moved to stop inflation? Not according to one member 
of  the Board of  Governors, Sherman Maisel, who argued the following in 
May  1966: 
When members looked at total reserves or nonborrowed reserves, either of 
which he took to be the principal measure of the [open market] committee’s 
actions, they must be appalled at the committee’s results. . . . In the five 
months since December 1 [1965], the committee had poured more reserves 
into the banking system than were furnished in the entire previous year. In 
fact . . .  since December 1, the total increase in reserves had been larger than 
in any full year since 1951. . . .  These results did not accord with either the 
committee’s intent, its statements or sound policy. . . .  The committee appar- 
ently had followed sub-goals such as feel of the market, net [free] reserves, 
or the need to offset shocks, and as a result it had moved in a direction 
opposite to its real policy aim. (FOMC, Minutes 10 May 1966, 62-63) 
Martin responded to this criticism with the view that “he did not think the 
committee should be too dissatisfied with monetary policy because of the re- 
cent trends in banking aggregates. . . . The Committee should not press too 
hard in the belief that monetary policy alone could achieve price stability. . . . 
Perhaps all members of  the Committee-and  he included himself-tended 
to think at times that monetary policy could do more than it in fact could.” 
Interestingly, Martin also expressed the “hope that the System would not find 
itself in the position of having raised the discount rate after the crest of  the 
cycle had been passed. If it did, it was likely to bear all the blame for subse- 
quent developments.” Martin went on to recall the Fed‘s moves to tighten pol- 
icy in 1957, and how the subsequent recession had been blamed on the Fed. 
Martin  then cautioned that “he thought the committee should bear that in 
mind” (FOMC, Minutes 10 May  1966,94-95). 
As Maisel succinctly explained to the FOMC in May 1966, the inflationary 
surge had been the result of poor targeting rules, not an inflationary intent by 
the Fed. Fed officials believed they were pursuing appropriate policies to con- 
tain inflation and assist in maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments 
but had stumbled into inflation because of their attachment to free reserves 
targeting and misinterpretation of rising interest rates. 
Despite the forceful arguments of Maisel and a few other members of the 
FOMC, the Fed did not reject the use of free reserves as its operating target 
(or nominal interest rates as a policy guide).20  In our view, the acceleration of 
20. The Fed never used a free reserves operating target mechanistically-discretion  always was 
important, and by the late 195Os, doubts about the reliability of free reserves led the Fed to adopt 
a more eclectic approach to policy. Much as the Fed appears to be groping for policy guides today, 
in the  1960s Fed policymakers discussed an array of  potential candidates, settling on none as 
paramount. This lack of specificity is reflected in a discussion between a Reserve Bank president 
and the FOMC account manager in 1959. The president remarked that he “did not know precisely 52  Charles W.  Calomiris and David C. Wheelock 
inflation in the mid-1960s cannot be attributed plausibly to perceived or actual 
shifts in the Fed’s taste for inflation. Clearly, the FOMC did not intend to in- 
crease inflation when it permitted the money  supply to rise before 1965, or 
when it stepped once again on the monetary gas peddle in  1967. Declining 
levels of free reserves during the 1960s reflected Fed efforts to prevent infla- 
tion. Similarly, it is important to note that nominal interest rates rose sharply, 
roughly doubling from 1962 to 1966. The inflationary surge of the mid-1960s 
thus was not the consequence of a rigid adherence to a nominal interest rate 
target like that of the World War I1 era.*’ 
How much of the onset of the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s can be 
attributed to the impact of the Great Depression?  As we have shown, the de- 
pression was not a watershed in terms of the Fed‘s fundamental objectives and 
targeting strategy. Under Benjamin Strong’s leadership, by  1924 the Fed was 
using open market operations and discount rate adjustments to pursue both 
domestic and international goals. At an operational level, the Fed targeted the 
borrowed reserve positions of member banks and judged the stance of its pol- 
icy by the levels of member bank borrowing and market interest rates. Over 
time, the Fed became more cognizant of the behavior of the supply of money, 
but throughout the 1950s and  1960s it never rejected free reserve or interest 
rate targeting in  favor of  a monetary aggregate operating strategy. Conse- 
quently, as in the 1920s and early 1930s, in the 1950s and 1960s monetary 
policy tended to exacerbate swings in economic activity and the price level, 
which explains to a great extent how the Fed “stumbled” into an inflationary 
monetary policy during the early 1960s. 
1.5.2  The New International Monetary Regime 
The Bretton Woods system represented a substantially new  international 
monetary regime in which excessive U.S. money growth (and concomitant ex- 
ternal imbalance) could continue for several years. Had the Fed been subject 
what was meant by an even keel policy. Should it be measured by net free reserves, net borrowed 
reserves, the feel of the market, or the intuition of the Account Manager?” The manager replied 
that he “thought it was a mixture of the things [the president] had mentioned” (FOMC, Minutes 
5 May  1959, 45). On another occasion, Chairman Martin  argued that when carrying  out pol- 
icy, “reference should be made primarily to the color, tone, and feel of the [government securi- 
ties] market . . . rather than to a specific level of free reserves” (FOMC, Minutes 11 September 
1962,48). 
21. We differ with Goodfriend (1991). who argues that the Fed used free reserves to disguise 
its true policy of controlling interest rates during both the 1920s and in the postaccord era. Free 
reserves was regarded by Fed officials as their appropriate operating target and also as a useful 
independent signal of conditions in the money market. Goodfriend is correct, however, that the 
Fed‘s  policy regime was fundamentally  nonmonetarist  and permitted  money supply growth to 
exacerbate fluctuations in the growth rate of nominal GDP. Another view, offered by Chari, Chris- 
tiano, and Eichenbaum (1996), is that the inflationary surge was the product of self-fulfilling ex- 
pectations of higher inflation by the public in an interest rate targeting regime. This seems implau- 
sible, however, because of Caskey’s (1985) finding that public perceptions of inflation persistently 
lagged actual inflation during the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, in the mid-l960s, expected 
inflation remained consistently lower than actual inflation. 53  The Great Depression as a Watershed for American Monetary Policy 
to the discipline of the gold standard as it existed before  1933, inflationary 
money growth could not have continued for so long, and it would not have 
been possible for the Fed to stumble into the inflation of the 1960s. 
The Bretton Woods system operated as a set of gold-dollar fixed exchange 
rate standards. The system began in 1946 and came fully into place as a world- 
wide monetary system in 1959. Under the Bretton Woods system, the United 
States was the only country that maintained a commitment to convertibility 
into gold, via the “gold window.” Other countries pegged their currencies to 
the dollar. Bretton Woods was thus like the interwar gold exchange standard in 
that most countries held their international reserves in the form of the currency 
of the country or countries at the core.22  The mechanism for maintaining gold 
convertibility under Bretton Woods, however, was  fundamentally different 
from that of the interwar gold exchange standard. It was this mechanism that 
explains how  inflation could persist in the United States during a period in 
which a fixed exchange rate between the dollar and gold was maintained. 
Neither the interwar gold exchange standard nor the Bretton Woods system 
was a pure  gold standard-both  permitted some discretion. Under Bretton 
Woods, however, the mechanism by which the balance of payments exerted 
discipline on central banks was largely removed from private markets and 
given to central banks themselves. This mechanism reflected a fundamental 
shift in ideology, from one that saw maintaining gold convertibility as para- 
mount for long-run prosperity to an ideology that viewed fixed exchange rates 
and gold convertibility  as desirable but not so important as to warrant the sacri- 
fice of  short-term economic stability in defense of  the international system. 
Discretionary monetary policy-“managed  money”-was  permitted under 
Bretton Woods to a degree never before achieved under a gold standard. 
Under  Bretton  Woods,  a  balance-of-payments deficit  (surplus)  for  the 
United States would be reflected in a buildup (contraction) of foreign central 
bank holdings of U.S. dollars, unless the foreign central banks and the United 
States exchanged dollars for gold. The Bretton Woods system imposed only 
limited constraints on member countries (including the United States) to pur- 
sue monetary and fiscal policies that were consistent with a long-run commit- 
ment to a fixed exchange rate. While foreign central banks could have enforced 
monetary discipline on the United States by  converting dollars into gold, in 
practice they refrained from doing so until  1965, when the French began to 
convert dollars into gold in the face of large and persisting American balance- 
of-payments deficits. By that time, a large dollar imbalance had been created 
by expansionary U.S. monetary policy. The relative world supplies of gold and 
dollars trended in opposite directions over this period, and clearly a fixed 
dollar-gold exchange rate was not sustainable under these circumstances. In 
22.  Redish (1993) argues that Bretton Woods  was thus an  “extension” of  the interwar gold 
standard, which, in turn, was one step on a long path delinking the  world’s currencies from gold 
(with Bretton Woods being the  last). See Bordo and Eichengreen (1993) and Eichengreen (1992) 
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the event, the Bretton Woods system collapsed from 1971 to 1973 following 
closure of the gold window on 15 August 1971. 
As we have seen, the Fed‘s  reaction to domestic inflation, persistent U.S. 
balance-of-payments deficits, and French demands for redemption of dollars 
caused only a brief interruption in the upward trend in money supply growth 
in the mid-1960s. Bordo (1993,57) argues that part of the reason for the Fed’s 
lack of sustained vigor was the widely held belief that the Bretton Woods sys- 
tem could be sustained without monetary discipline. Influential economists ar- 
gued that monetary expansion could continue, while the balance-of-payments 
problem could be addressed by  other policies (Bordo 1993, 58-59;  Yeager 
Federal Reserve officials became increasingly concerned about the balance 
of payments in the late 1950s. But Fed officials were also wary of combating 
a balance-of-payments deficit with policies that might interfere with  other 
goals. For example, Alfred Hayes, president of  the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, argued that “I would think it unwise to let the gold outflow itself 
affect our monetary policy directly, i.e., in the way of using a tightening move 
directed specifically toward stemming the flow and unrelated to domestic eco- 
nomic developments” (FOMC, Minutes 10 November 1958, 14-15).  On  an- 
other occasion, a Reserve Bank president expressed concern about the balance- 
of-payments deficit but was reluctant to advocate a tighter policy for fear of 
disrupting the market for government securities: “Generally, he felt that the 
course of monetary policy should be moving toward a more restrictive posture. 
At the same time, he was quite concerned about the rate picture in the govern- 
ment securities market and the problems facing the Treasury in  the future” 
(FOMC, Minutes 5 May  1959, 34). This reluctance to face squarely gold out- 
flows and a balance-of-payments deficit stands in marked contrast to the Fed’s 
swift reaction to gold outflows in  1931. At that time, Fed officials agreed that 
maintaining convertibility of the dollar into gold at a constant price was funda- 
mental to long-run economic stability, and they were willing to tighten mone- 
tary policy in the middle of a depression in order to preserve the international 
monetary regime. By contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s, Fed officials viewed 
the balance of  payments with concern but hesitated to make it the sole, or 
even the primary, focus of  policy. This change in  philosophy, attaching less 
importance to the gold standard rule and more to discretionary policy was an 
important legacy of the Great Depression. 
Although Fed officials were unwilling to tighten sufficiently to arrest the 
balance-of-payments deficit, they did see the deficit as influencing their ability 
to promote domestic economic activity. Chairman Martin, for example, argued 
that “if the Federal Reserve got the reputation of  following a cheap money 
policy just for the sake of  doing so, people abroad would be encouraged to 
think the System was not concerned with the balance of payments or the sound- 
ness of the dollar” (FOMC, Minutes  13 December 1960,40). Martin also ar- 
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gued that “the balance of payments problem . . .  was a vital factor in the unem- 
ployment situation. Foreign capital was finding the United States less and less 
attractive, there were pressures for movement of capital abroad, and this was 
having a deleterious effect on employment in this country” (FOMC, Minutes 
6 March 1962,56). 
Martin often spoke of  the international payments deficit as the most im- 
portant problem facing the Fed. As often, however, he seems to have found 
excuses for not taking stronger action. For example, in November 1964 Martin 
expressed a preference for a tighter policy because of the worsening balance- 
of-payments deficit and the potential for increased inflation. He was unwilling, 
however, to advocate a tightening without broad committee support. Martin 
also pointed out that a new Treasury issue was forthcoming, which generally 
called for an even keel policy. Reflecting the frustration of pursuing multiple 
objectives with a single tool, New York Fed President Hayes then complained 
that “there seemed never to be a right time to make a difficult decision, and 
that the need for maintaining an even keel during Treasury financings inhibited 
action by the Committee much of  the time” (FOMC, Minutes  10 November 
1964, 82). 
Fed officials also understood that the balance-of-payments deficit stemmed 
from differences in the macroeconomic policies of different countries. At an 
FOMC meeting in  1959, a Fed staff member reported that “the net result of 
attempts in this country to validate our wage and price policies through mone- 
tary expansion could succeed only if we could inflate the whole world.” The 
staff member went on to argue that expansionary monetary and fiscal policy 
could “price United States’ goods out of world markets” because officials of 
other countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands, surely would not per- 
mit inflation in their domestic prices (FOMC, Minutes 5 May  1959, 14). The 
same official, however, was unwilling to blame monetary policy alone for the 
balance-of-payments deficit. In arguing that gold outflows “call for a generally 
restrictive credit policy . . . more effective corrections . . . would be moves to 
reduce the budgetary deficit and the checking of price rises due to wage and 
other cost increases” (FOMC, Minutes 21 October 1958, 17-18). 
The  Fed‘s  unwillingness to  tighten  sufficiently to  stem the  balance-of- 
payments deficit led it to consider other actions it might take. One of the earli- 
est of the policies intended to restore external balance was Operation Twist- 
an  attempt to twist the term  structure of  interest rates, to keep  short-term 
interest rates high enough to attract foreign capital while keeping long-term 
interest rates low enough to favor domestic expansion. This unsuccessful pol- 
icy is now a popular textbook example of government failure to understand the 
concept of arbitrage in financial markets. 
In fact, Fed officials were skeptical about Operation Twist from the begin- 
ning. Martin, for example, believed that “when an attempt was made to deter- 
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the System would be in trouble” (FOMC, Minutes 22 November 1960, 42). 
Nevertheless, Martin believed that the tactic was worth trying (see FOMC, 
Minutes 20 August 1963,58). 
Another Fed initiative to combat the balance-of-payments deficit and the 
weak dollar was direct intervention in foreign exchange markets. The Gold 
Reserve Act of  1934, which established the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization 
Fund, had been interpreted by counsel to the Board of Governors as precluding 
Federal Reserve intervention in foreign exchange markets, except as agent for 
the Treasury. In  1961, the Fed reconsidered the efficacy of  intervention and 
whether it had the legal standing to intervene on its own. This time, the board’s 
counsel argued that the Fed did have the right to intervene. Concern on the part 
of individual FOMC members, however, led the Fed to seek the advice of the 
Treasury and the banking committees of  Congress. The treasury secretary 
wrote to the FOMC that “it is surely a proper central banking function to en- 
gage in temporary operations that will help to buffer and moderate tendencies 
toward volatile flows of funds” (FOMC, Minutes 19 December 1961, 85-86). 
With that endorsement, the FOMC began its independent intervention in for- 
eign exchange markets. 
Other policies intended to correct international payments imbalances with- 
out slowing domestic activity included new agreements with foreign central 
banks  to  forebear  from  demanding  gold,  the  issuance  of  foreign-curr- 
ency-denominated U.S. bonds (“Roosa bonds”), requests of early repayment 
by foreign governments of debts to the U.S. government, the removal of inter- 
est rate ceilings on U.S. bank time deposits, capital outflow constraints im- 
posed in the United States, and changes in U.S. tax treatment of foreign earn- 
ings.  Balance-of-payments deficits continued,  however,  and  the  long-term 
feasibility of the existing dollar-gold standard increasingly became a mathe- 
matical improbability. 
Such delay could not have happened under the classical gold standard. That 
system imposed strict limits on the ability of central banks to ignore external 
imbalance in the interest of internal growth. It is true that limited and tempo- 
rary sterilization of gold outflows was possible under the classical gold stan- 
dard, and there is some evidence that central banks resisted the so-called rules 
of the game (by which is meant a policy of reinforcing rather than sterilizing 
the effects of short-run gold flows on money). Nevertheless, a sustained out- 
flow of reserves over the years was not feasible under the discipline of the gold 
standard. Under Bretton Woods, by contrast, the absence of market-determined 
gold flows deprived the Fed of an early warning sign of unsustainable money 
policy and enabled greater monetary policy discretion. 
1  S.3 
Although important, the Fed’s flawed policy framework and the absence of 
gold standard discipline cannot account entirely for the monetary policy out- 
comes of the 1960s and 1970s, especially for the Fed‘s unwillingness to quell 
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inflation once it had clearly begun. Another contributor to these outcomes, 
which did represent a break with predepression policy, was the Fed‘s policy of 
stabilizing the prices of government securities. This policy was begun in the 
mid-I930s, became the sole objective of policy during World War 11, and con- 
tinued even after the 1951 accord. The effect of  this policy in the 1960s was 
the partial monetization of that decade’s growing fiscal deficits. 
The Federal Reserve System was established with two guiding principles- 
the gold standard and a theory of banking that later became known as the real 
bills doctrine. Although Federal Reserve Banks were permitted to buy U.S. 
government securities, the extension of  Federal Reserve credit was limited by 
their holdings of gold and short-term commercial securities acquired mainly 
by making discount-window  Hence, the Federal Reserve Act implicitly 
limited the extent to which federal debt could be monetized. The Fed first 
departed from real bills principles during World War  I, when it encouraged 
banks to buy government securities by offering to lend them reserves against 
their security holdings at a rate that guaranteed the banks a profit. During the 
war, however, the Fed always held sufficient gold to back its liabilities. Another 
apparent departure from real bills principles came when the Fed made open 
market purchases of government securities in the 1920s, but again, the Fed’s 
gold and commercial paper reserves were never jeopardized. 
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, however, constituted a fundamental depar- 
ture from the principles underlying the Federal Reserve Act by expanding the 
permissible assets backing Fed  liabilities to include government securities. 
That legislation, and its permanent replacement in 1933, substantially weak- 
ened the checks on Federal Reserve monetization of government debt. As we 
have seen, the Fed came under considerable pressure to maintain low yields on 
government securities in the mid-l930s, and this policy became paramount 
during World War 11. 
Whether or not the Fed’s  policy of  maintaining ceiling yields on federal 
government debt during World War  I1 was justifiable, the Fed‘s  continuing 
commitment to stabilization of government securities prices after the 1951 ac- 
cord is puzzling. While the Fed had agreed as part of its accord with the Trea- 
sury to “maintain an orderly market” for government securities (Krooss 1969, 
3056), such a vague commitment had no real force. Furthermore, in contrast 
to the 1930s, the Fed was sufficiently large by  the 1950s to easily offset any 
interventions by the Treasury, thus removing any credible threat by  the Trea- 
sury to force the Fed’s hand. 
23. The Federal Reserve was founded in part to  provide a mechanism for increasing and de- 
creasing the supply of bank reserves and currency in response to fluctuations in the needs of banks 
for accommodating the demands of their customers for loans and currency. The real bills doctrine 
holds that when banks restrict their lending to  short-term commercial notes, the supply of credit 
will be sufficient but not inflationary. Thus, the extension of Federal Reserve credit on the basis 
of the rediscount of commercial paper will ensure the noninflationary accommodation of credit 
demand associated with real economic activity. See Wheelock (1991) and the references therein 
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What then accounts for the Fed’s continuing commitment to support govern- 
ment securities prices in the postaccord period? Part of the answer lies in the 
magnitude of Treasury borrowings in the early 1950s, which coincided with 
the Korean War. The burden of the war grew in the years immediately follow- 
ing the accord. While national security expenditures accounted for only 33 
percent of  the federal budget in 1950, they reached 67 percent in 1952 (Blum 
et al. 1973,726). It would have been tantamount to “unpatriotic” for the FOMC 
to have completely neglected the government’s financing needs at this time of 
fiscal strain. President Truman made clear to FOMC members his view of their 
responsibilities in a meeting with them on 31 January 1951: “The President 
emphasized that we must combat Communist influence on many fronts. He 
said one way  to do this is to maintain confidence in the government’s credit 
and in government securities” (FOMC, Minutes 3  1 January 195  1,24).  As dur- 
ing World War 11, Fed officials undoubtedly believed that the national interest 
would be served by easing the government’s debt management problems during 
the Korean conflict. 
Perhaps similar thinking about the role of monetary policy during armed 
conflicts partly explains the Fed’s  bond price stabilization policy during the 
Vietnam War. Some evidence of this is revealed by meetings between Fed and 
Treasury officials about securities markets in conjunction with the war’s escala- 
tion. For example, in describing a 1965 meeting between Fed officials and Paul 
Volcker, then deputy undersecretary of the treasury for monetary affairs, the 
Fed’s account manager reported that the Fed had not been asked to peg the 
prices of government securities but nevertheless to lend general market “sup- 
port” (FOMC, Minutes  10 October 1965,26). 
The view that Korea and Vietnam contributed to deficit monetization, how- 
ever, does not imply that monetization was an unavoidable outcome of those 
wars. The scale of the wars was probably not great enough to have produced 
special wartime monetary powers (deficit monetization or the suspension of 
the gold standard). If those powers had not been in place prior to the wars (as 
a consequence of depression-era changes), monetization of  government debt 
might have been largely avoided. 
Furthermore, in the absence of  an automatic mechanism for monetizing 
deficits, the Johnson administration likely would have felt more pressure to 
choose between war expenditures and Great Society programs. It is possible 
that both the Korean and Vietnam eras would have seen shrinkage in non-war- 
related federal expenditures if the post-World  War I1 regime had been charac- 
terized by  a return to the gold standard and the absence of  Fed authority to 
monetize deficits. 
The desire to placate the Treasury by maintaining low and stable yields on 
government securities, especially during wartime, was only one reason the Fed 
continued to attempt to manipulate government securities prices. A second rea- 
son, revealed in the minutes of FOMC meetings during the 1950s and 1960s, 
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ently inefficient or unstable. Not only was the policy of even keel near dates 
of new Treasury issues accepted virtually without question, but Fed interven- 
tion seems to have been widely viewed as necessary to preserve stability in the 
market. Later, a similar view was taken toward the foreign exchange market. 
While no direct reference is made in the minutes to the experience of the de- 
pression, we wonder whether the view that financial markets were inherently 
unstable and market prices were in need of “management” was itself in part a 
reaction to the depressi~n.~~ 
1  S.4  A Diminution of Federal Reserve Independence and a New 
Economic Ideology 
Although some New Deal legislation expanded the scope of Federal Reserve 
powers, other legislation served to lessen the Fed‘s  independence. We  have 
argued that diminished political independence contributed to the refocus of 
monetary policy toward the stability of the government securities market in the 
1930s. Although the accord restored a measure of independence to the Fed, 
the Fed remained under pressure to keep market yields on government securi- 
ties low and to attempt to engineer higher output and employment in the near 
term, even at the expense of higher inflation down the road (e.g., see De Long 
1995). A monetary policy framework that interpreted rising nominal interest 
rates as evidence of tighter monetary policy, coupled with pressure to fund 
federal government borrowing at the lowest possible cost, caused monetization 
of government debt. Over time, this produced higher inflation. 
24. The use of monetary policy to stabilize the market for government debt represented one 
sharp departure from the Fed’s founding principles  and the policies it pursued  before  1933. A 
second departure,  also first appearing with  the Glass-Steagall Act of  1932, involved collateral 
requirements for discount-window loans and, later, the uses of Federal Reserve credit. In line with 
real bills principles, the Federal Reserve Act restricted the collateral for discount-window loans to 
high-quality, short-term commercial loans. In relaxing the collateral provisions, first in 1932, and 
then by subsequent legislation during 1933-35,  Congress accepted the argument that many banks 
with sound assets had been denied access to the discount window because they had lacked eligible 
collateral and that this had worsened the banking  collapse and depression. In addition,  it was 
widely believed that inadequate access to credit had forced the bankruptcy of many firms, and so 
the Fed was authorized to lend directly to individuals, partnerships, and corporations and to make 
industrial advances of up to five years. Although these lending provisions have never resulted in 
large extensions of Federal Reserve credit, they represented a fundamental break with the prin- 
ciples underlying the Federal Reserve Act as it was originally conceived. 
The expanded scope for Federal Reserve lending reflects a view that legal restrictions had lim- 
ited the Fed’s ability to protect the banking system from collapse during 1929-33.  In essence, the 
Fed had failed to act as lender of last resort, and relaxed discount-window borrowing rules were 
one attempt to ensure that the Fed would not fail again in its responsibilities for lack of  legal 
authority. In recent years, the Fed has shown considerable willingness to act in the name of pre- 
serving financial stability. Examples include its guarantees of liquidity to banks to preserve stabil- 
ity of the commercial paper market in the wake of Penn Central‘s default in 1970, and of financial 
markets in general following the stock market collapse of 1987. Whether or not such interventions 
constitute appropriate lender-of-last-resort behavior or are otherwise socially justifiable (for op- 
posing views, see Schwartz 1992; Calomiris 1994), the Fed seems unlikely to allow a collapse of 
the financial system on the scale of the Great Depression without exerting considerable effort to 
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By  reducing the role of  Federal Reserve Bank presidents in favor of  the 
Board of  Governors, the Banking Act of  1935 may  have  contributed to the 
system’s willingness to stabilize the yields of government securities and cer- 
tainly subjected the Fed to greater political pressures. Did this make the Fed 
more willing to attempt fine-tuning operations or to accept higher inflation 
over the long term in exchange for faster real growth and higher employment 
in the near term? Or was that policy choice more the product of Keynesian 
ideology, which prescribed interest rate manipulation to promote growth and 
employment objectives? 
Others have written extensively on the new economic ideology born of the 
Great Depression and associated with Keynes, which increasingly dominated 
policy discussions, both within and outside the Federal Reserve during the 
1960s (e.g., De Long 1995). This macroeconomic paradigm held that mone- 
tary policy could increase output and employment without producing inflation 
so long as resources were not fully employed. Some proponents acknowledged 
that expansionary monetary policy might increase the rate of inflation but ar- 
gued that modest inflation was an acceptable cost of faster growth and higher 
employment. For example, Fed governor Maisel argued that “there is a trade- 
off between idle men and a more stable value for the dollar. A conscious deci- 
sion must be made as to how much unemployment and loss of output must be 
made in order to get smaller price rises” (Maisel 1973, 14). 
Another cornerstone of the Keynesian ideology was that inflation was not 
always the product of  monetary policy. As Maisel puts it, “Some price in- 
creases originate on the cost side or in particular industries. These cannot be 
halted by monetary policy” (1973, 14). Accelerating inflation in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, he argues, was caused by “government deficits; . . .  specula- 
tive investment in plant, equipment, and labor by  business corporations; . . . 
use of  economic power to raise wages and profits.. . . But most significant 
were the government deficits” (Maisel 1973, 12). Although not all economists 
or policymakers held these views, enough did to influence monetary policy. 
Even today, high-ranking officials of the Federal Reserve System contend that 
monetary policy can and should be used to maintain full employment (eg, 
Blinder 1996). 
The Great Depression clearly influenced mainstream economic thought in 
the 1960s, especially among key economic policy advisors. Lucas writes that 
one of the “the main features of the Keynesian Revolution and the neoclassical 
synthesis into which it evolved in the United States . . . [was] the onset of 
the Great Depression and the consequent shift of attention from explaining a 
recurrent pattern of ups and downs to explaining an economy apparently stuck 
in an interminable down” (1980, 704). Even though much of  today’s  main- 
stream theory rejects many Keynesian ideas, according to Lucas, the Great 
Depression continues “to defy explanation by existing [new] economic analy- 
sis” (1980,706). For macroeconomics, and to some extent for macroeconomic 
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1.5.5  The Final Depression Legacy: Disinflation in the 1980s and Price 
Targeting in the 1990s 
We  have argued that various legacies of  the Great Depression were im- 
portant in allowing the Fed’s traditional (and flawed) operating strategy to pro- 
duce the inflationary surge of the 1960s and 1970s. These include the perma- 
nent collapse of the gold standard, debt monetization powers, the decline in 
Fed independence, and a new macroeconomic ideology that regarded financial 
markets as unstable and government intervention as desirable. We  would em- 
phasize that these various legacies were not equally important in explaining 
the origins of inflation or its persistence. With respect to the origins of infla- 
tion, the collapse of the gold standard was central. By itself, a change in macro- 
economic thought could not have changed monetary policy fundamentally, nor 
could reduced Federal Reserve independence or even the opening of  an ex- 
plicit avenue of  debt monetization. The necessary condition that made these 
other influences important was the replacement of the interwar gold standard 
with the Bretton Woods system, which allowed price-level drift that otherwise 
would have been impo~sible.~~ 
While the collapse of the gold standard was essential in the origins of infla- 
tion, other legacies of  the depression were probably more important for ex- 
plaining the persistence of  inflationary policy in the late  1960s and  1970s. 
That postponement of disinflation until the 1980s imposed large costs on the 
economy. As Goodfriend (1993) emphasizes in his discussion of the disinfla- 
tion of the early 1980s, the costs of  avoiding inflation are much lower than the 
costs of disinflating when the central bank’s commitment to end inflation lacks 
credibility. As Caskey (1985) has shown, inflationary expectations during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s were consistently below actual inflation. Caskey 
explains that fact in the context of a Bayesian model of inflation expectations. 
He argues that the public was slow to grasp the change toward inflation bias in 
monetary policy. He finds that the public’s view of the Fed‘s reaction function 
significantly lagged the actual changes because learning about central bank 
intentions takes time. From that perspective, the Fed probably could have re- 
duced inflation in the 1960s at little cost, relative to the costs borne from 1980 
to 1982. 
The inflation of the 1960s and 1970s, and the economic costs of disinflation 
in the 1980s, have undermined some of the legacies of the depression. In this 
sense, the consequences of  the institutional legacies of  the depression have 
weakened the long-run (future) importance of the institutional and ideological 
25. Unlike Bordo and Eichengreen (chap. 12 in this  volume) we  do not believe that, in  the 
absence of the  depression and the Bretton Woods system, the gold standard would necessarily 
have collapsed permanently during the postwar period as the result of gold scarcity. Many other 
counterfactual outcomes seem as plausible to us-including  the adoption of bimetallic or symmet- 
allic standards, or other methods for reestablishing a balance between the real reserves of nations 
adhering to a hard-currency standard and the real supply of reserves. 62  Charles W.  Calomiris and David C. Wheelock 
changes wrought in the 1930s. Clearly, the new emphasis on price stability as 
a central short-run concern for monetary policy in the 1990s is something of a 
throwback to the predepression gold standard. One also sees a rebirth of “long- 
run” thinking in macroeconomics, including a new emphasis on the need for 
credibility in long-run control of deficits and in deficit monetization. Even the 
“cleansing benefits of  recessions” is enjoying a rebirth in macroeconomics. 
Thus, looking forward to the twenty-first century, it may  be that the influ- 
ence of  the depression-especially  the potential inflation bias produced by 
depression-era policies-may  lie more in the past than in the future. 
On the other hand, despite the current vigor of the anti-inflation hawks and 
the decline in the ideological legacy of the Great Depression, it is possible to 
argue that the most important legacy of  the depression remains intact-the 
destruction of international monetary linkages has not been undone or replaced 
with new  constraints on discretionary policy.26  The lack of  an institutional 
check on discretionary money supply growth suggests that inflation bias may 
again be latent, waiting to reemerge to finance the widely predicted explosion 
of government deficits in the twenty-first century. 
1.6  Conclusion 
The Great Depression brought little change in Fed thinking about the appro- 
priate goals, targets, and instruments of domestic monetary policy. At least as 
late as the 1960s, Fed behavior was much like that of  the 1920s. The free 
reserves operating framework, which included the use of nominal interest rates 
as a policy guide, contributed both to the economic collapse of the depression 
and to the inflation of the 1960s and 1970s.  In this sense, the Great Depression 
did not change monetary policy. 
The Great Depression did result in important institutional and ideological 
changes, however, and these changes made possible the sustained inflation of 
the 1960s.  The fundamental change was the abandonment of  the interwar gold 
standard and its subsequent replacement by the Bretton Woods dollar system. 
The Fed had carried out a discretionary monetary policy during the 1920s and 
early  1930s under the interwar gold exchange standard. Gold, however, re- 
mained an important barrier to discretion-a  barrier that Fed officials were 
unwilling to breach, even as the economy collapsed in 193  1. A new political 
regime was required, first to devalue, and ultimately to replace the interwar 
gold standard with the Bretton Woods system. 
Under Bretton Woods, monetization of  government debts and Keynesian 
policy experiments could take place without the swift disciplinary response of 
26. In contrast to the United States, some countries have adopted new institutional restraints on 
discretionary policy, such as legislated mandates on central hanks to limit price-level fluctuations. 
The European Monetary Union, with its common currency, can also be viewed as a fundamental 
institutional change designed to prevent discretionary monetary policy at the level of the individ- 
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gold outflows. Once inflation appeared, policymakers  lacked the willingness 
to disinflate. This unwillingness stemmed in part from the Fed‘s  reduced inde- 
pendence, the continuing role of money supply growth as an instrument of 
government debt management, and new economic views about the causes of 
inflation and the appropriate role of monetary policy in the economy. Given 
the persisting fiscal deficits of  the postwar era and the new institutional envi- 
ronment, born of the Great Depression, Bretton Woods was doomed and a great 
inflation was almost inevitable. 
One legacy of the Great Depression-the  dominance of Keynesian macro- 
economic theory among professional economists-has  now faded. Although 
some policymakers remain enamored with the possibility of using monetary 
policy  to increase economic growth, such views no longer have the profes- 
sional respectability that they had during the 1960s. Moreover, the high infla- 
tion of the 1970s made both policymakers  and their economic advisors wary 
of policies that might ignite another inflationary spiral. Still, the permanent 
absence of  a “nominal anchor” for the dollar provides an enduring legacy of 
uncertainty  about the  long-run  path of  monetary  policy  in the twenty-first 
century. 
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